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Abstract
We study how changes in the steady-state real interest rate affect the optimal inflation target in a
New Keynesian DSGE model with trend inflation and a lower bound on the nominal interest rate. In
this setup, a lower steady-state real interest rate increases the probability of hitting the lower bound.
That effect can be counteracted by an increase in the inflation target, but the resulting higher steady-
state inflation has a welfare cost in and of itself. We use an estimated DSGE model to quantify that
trade-off and determine the implied optimal inflation target, conditional on the monetary policy rule in
place before the financial crisis. The relation between the steady-state real interest rate and the optimal
inflation target is downward sloping. While the increase in the optimal inflation rate is in general smaller
than the decline in the steady-state real interest rate, in the currently empirically relevant region the slope
of the relation is found to be close to −1. That slope is robust to allowing for parameter uncertainty.
Under “make-up” strategies such as price level targeting, the required increase in the optimal inflation
target under lower steady-state real interest rate is, however, much smaller.
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1 Introduction
A recent but sizable literature has pointed to a permanent –or, at least very persistent– decline in the
“natural” rate of interest in advanced economies (Holston et al., 2017, Laubach and Williams, 2016). Various
likely sources of that decline have been discussed, including a lower trend growth rate of productivity
(Gordon, 2015), demographic factors (Eggertsson et al., 2017), or an enhanced preference for safe and liquid
assets (Caballero and Farhi, 2015, Del Negro et al., 2017, Summers, 2014).
A lower steady-state real interest rate matters for monetary policy. Given average inflation, a lower
steady-state real rate will cause the nominal interest rate to hit its zero lower bound (ZLB) more frequently,
hampering the ability of monetary policy to stabilize the economy, bringing about more frequent (and
potentially protracted) episodes of recession and below-target inflation. The low interest rate environment
is a key factor behind the Federal Reserve’s current review of its monetary policy framework (see Clarida
2019, Fuhrer et al. 2018).1
In the face of that risk several prominent economists have forcefully argued in favor of raising the
inflation target (see, among others, Ball 2014, Blanchard et al. 2010, and, with qualifications, Williams
2016). Since a lower natural rate of interest is conducive to a higher ZLB incidence, one would expect a
higher inflation target to be desirable as, other things equal, a higher inflation target increases the steady-
state nominal interest rate and reduces the ZLB incidence. But the answer to the practical question of by
how much should the target be increased is not obvious. Indeed, the benefit of providing a better hedge
against hitting the ZLB, which is an infrequent event, comes at a cost of higher steady-state inflation which
induces permanent costs, as recently argued by Bernanke (2016) among others. The answer to this question
thus requires to assess how the tradeoff between the incidence of the ZLB and the welfare cost induced
by steady-state inflation is modified when the natural rate of interest decreases. While the decrease in
the natural rate of interest has been emphasized in the recent literature, such assessment has received
surprisingly little attention.
The present paper contributes to this debate by asking four questions. First, to what extent does a lower
steady-state real interest rate (r?) call for a higher optimal inflation target (pi?)? Second, does the source
of decline in r? matter? Third, how does parameter uncertainty affect the (r?,pi?) curve? Fourth, to what
extent does the strategy and rules followed by the central bank alter the relation between r? and pi?? We
focus on the US economy but the issues we investigate equally apply to other advanced economies –in
particular the euro-area – because the decline in r? appears to be a global phenomenon (see Brand et al.
2019, Del Negro et al. 2018, Rachel and Summers 2019).2
We provide answers to these questions using a structural, empirically estimated, macroeconomic model.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: (i) The relation between r? and pi? is downward sloping,
1Note that the numerical value of the inflation target is not part of that review.
2We provide a comparable analysis for the euro area in a work in progress.
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but not necessarily, in general, one-for-one; (ii) in the vicinity of the pre-crisis values for r?, the slope of the
(r?,pi?) locus is close to −1, though slightly below in absolute value ; the relation is largely robust to the
underlying source of variation in r? for a plausible range of r? values; (iii) the slope of the (r?,pi?) locus
remains close to −1 when the central bank is uncertain about the parameters of the model characterizing
the economy, including r?; (iv) the slope of the curve is also robust to various alteration of the monetary
policy rule, albeit not to considering rules such as price level targeting, which consist in committing to
making-up for past deviations from the inflation target.
Our results are obtained from extensive simulations of a New Keynesian DSGE model estimated for the
US over a Great Moderation sample.3 The framework features: (i) price stickiness and partial indexation
of prices to trend inflation, (ii) wage stickiness and partial indexation of wages to both inflation and pro-
ductivity, and (iii) a ZLB constraint on the nominal interest rate. The first two features imply the presence
of potentially substantial costs associated with non-zero steady-state inflation. The third feature warrants
a strictly positive inflation rate, in order to mitigate the incidence and adverse effects of the ZLB. To our
knowledge, these three features have not been jointly taken into account in previous analyses of optimal
inflation.
Our analysis focuses on the trade-off between the costs attached to the probability of hitting the ZLB
and the costs induced by a positive steady-state inflation rate for a given monetary policy strategy. In the
baseline, monetary policy follows an inertial interest rate rule estimated using pre-crisis data. Importantly,
the specification of the policy rule allows for interest rates to remain “low for long” after the end of a ZLB
episode.
According to our simulations, the optimal inflation target obtained when the policymaker is assumed
to know the economy’s parameters with certainty (and taken to correspond to the mean of the posterior
distribution) is around 2% (in annual terms). This result is obtained in an environment with a relatively
low 6% probability of hitting the ZLB when the target for the inflation rate is set at the historical mean of
inflation, and given the size of the shocks estimated on our Great Moderation sample. Our simulations
also show that a 100 basis point drop of r? from its estimated 2.5% pre-crisis level will almost double the
probability of hitting the ZLB if the monetary authority keeps its inflation target unchanged. The optimal
reaction of the central bank is to increase the inflation target by 99 basis points. This optimal reaction
mitigates the increase in the probability of hitting the ZLB. We also consider structural shocks with higher
variance, and alternative markups in the goods and labor market . Strikingly, while the level of the locus
can be significantly affected by those changes, overall the slope of the (r?,pi?) relation remains close to −1
in the vicinity of the pre-crisis parameter region.
A noticeable feature of our approach is that we perform a full-blown Bayesian estimation of the model.
This allows us not only to assess the uncertainty surrounding pi?, but also to derive an optimal inflation
target taking into account the parameter uncertainty facing the policy maker, including uncertainty with
3In a work in progress, we show that very similar results obtain in a model estimated with euro area data
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regard to the determinants of the steady-state real interest rate. When that parameter uncertainty is allowed
for, the optimal inflation target value increases significantly, to 2.40%. The higher optimal target under
parameter uncertainty reflects the fact that the loss function is asymmetric, so that choosing an inflation
target that is lower than the optimal one is more costly than choosing an inflation target that is above. In
spite of the higher level, it remains true that a Bayesian-theoretic optimal inflation target rises by about 90
basis points in response to a downward shift of the distribution in r? by 100 basis points.
Finally, we study how potential changes in the monetary policy rule or strategy affect the (r?,pi?) rela-
tion. We consider a number of different cases: (i) defining the inflation target in terms of average realized
inflation as opposed to a parameter in the rule; (ii) a central bank constrained by an effective lower bound
on the policy rate that can be below zero; (iii) a central bank with a lower or higher smoothing parameter in
the interest-rate policy rule; (iv) a central bank with a smoothing component that involves the lagged actual
policy rate instead of the lagged shadow rate; and (v) a central bank targeting the price level rather than
the inflation rate. All these changes have an impact on the level of pi? for any given level of r?. Yet, only in
the case of a higher interest rate smoothing and price level targeting do we find a noticeable change in the
slope of the (r?,pi?) relation. In these two cases, the relation is much less steep, illustrating the strength of
“make up” strategies to overturn the ZLB, under the assumption of full credibility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our baseline model. Section 3
discusses how the model is estimated and simulated, as well as how the welfare-based optimal inflation
target is computed. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the (r?,pi?) relation under the baseline estimates
as well as for a set of alternative parameters. Section 5 presents and discusses this locus under parame-
ter uncertainty. Section 6 investigates the (r?,pi?) under alternative monetary policy rules and strategies.
Finally Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
To our knowledge no paper has systematically investigated the (r?,pi?) relation. Coibion et al. (2012) (and
its follow-up Dordal-i-Carreras et al. (2016)) and Kiley and Roberts (2017) are the papers most closely re-
lated to ours, as they study optimal inflation in quantitative set-ups that account for the ZLB. However, the
analyses in Coibion et al. (2012) assume a constant steady-state natural rate of interest, so a key difference
is our focus on eliciting the relation between the steady-state real interest rate and optimal inflation. Other
differences are (i) we estimate, rather than calibrate, the model, and (ii) we allow for wage rigidity in the
form of infrequent, staggered, wage adjustments. A distinctive feature with respect to Kiley and Roberts
(2017) is that we use a model-consistent, micro-founded loss function to compute optimal inflation.
A series of papers assessed the probability that the US economy hit the ZLB for a given inflation target.
Interestingly, our own assessment of this pre-crisis ZLB incidence falls in the ballpark of available estimates,
e.g., Chung et al. (2012). As we show, when the inflation target is not adjusted, but allowing for post-Great
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Moderation shocks, we also get “post-crisis” probability of hitting the ZLB that are comparable to the ones
obtained in recent related studies such as Chung et al. (2019).
We also emphasize that a change in the monetary policy strategy as an alternative to a higher inflation
target in the face of a lower r? helps better alleviate more frequent zero lower bound episodes as in e.g.
Kiley and Roberts (2017) and Bernanke et al. (2019). As in these studies, our analysis does not explicitly
consider alternative instruments –such as active balance sheet or fiscal policies– that policymakers also
used to mitigate the ZLB constraint. While Chung et al. (2019), Debortoli et al. (2019), Eberly et al. (2019),
Swanson (2018) have documented how such policies helped overcome that constraint, there is so far no
consensus on the extent to which that was the case.
Our paper is also connected to the voluminous literature on monetary policy under uncertainty, al-
though to our knowledge this literature has not investigated the impact of uncertainty on the determina-
tion of the optimal inflation target.4
Other relevant references, albeit ones that put little or no emphasis on the ZLB, are the following. An
early literature focuses on sticky prices and monetary frictions. In such a context, as shown by Khan
et al. (2003) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010), the optimal rate of inflation should be slightly negative.
Similarly, a negative optimal inflation would result from an environment with trend productivity growth
and prices and wages both sticky, as shown by Amano et al. (2009). In this kind of environment, moving
from a 2% to a 4% inflation target would be extremely costly, as suggested by Ascari et al. (2018). By
contrast, adding search and matching frictions to the setup, Carlsson and Westermark (2016) show that
optimal inflation can be positive. Bilbiie et al. (2014) find positive optimal inflation can be an outcome in
a sticky-price model with endogenous entry and product variety. Somewhat related, Adam and Weber
(2019) show that, even without any ZLB concern, optimal inflation might be positive in the context of
a model with heterogeneous firms and systematic firm-level productivity trends. Finally, Lepetit (2018)
shows that optimal inflation can be different from zero when profits and utility flows are discounted at
different rates, as is generally the case in overlapping-generation models. In a parameterized example of
the latter he shows the optimal steady-state inflation is significantly above zero.
Our assessment of the (welfare) cost of inflation critically relies on our assumptions of a Calvo mecha-
nism for price and wage setting. Among the recent papers with ZLB, Blanco (2016) studies optimal inflation
in a state-dependent pricing model, i.e. a “menu cost” model. In this setup, optimal inflation is typically
positive, and higher than with time-dependent pricing. Indeed, as in our analysis, positive inflation edges
the economy against detrimental effects of ZLB.5 In addition, as shown by Nakamura et al. (2018), the pres-
ence of state-dependent pricing weakens considerably the positive relationship between inflation and price
dispersion, thus reducing the costs of inflation. Nakamura et al. (2018) further argue that menu costs are a
4Prominent references to this literature are listed in e.g. in Williams (2013).
5By contrast, see Burstein and Hellwig (2008) for a similar exercise under menu costs without ZLB, which leads to negative
optimal inflation rate.
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more plausible mecanism for pricing frictions.6 Two points are however worth making. First, in the range
of values for the inflation target that we consider, the difference between the welfare cost in a Calvo model
and in a menu cost model is less dramatic than with a 10 percent or higher inflation rate, as documented
e.g. by Nakamura et al. (2018). Second, most recent empirical analyses of price-setting show that there
is a mass of small price changes in the data that cannot be rationalized by a menu cost model. To fit the
micro data, much of this recent literature typically introduce a random opportunity of price change, hence
a Calvo component, in the menu cost model (see e.g. Alvarez et al. 2016). In such an augmented menu cost
model, the distinction with the assessment taken from Calvo model is bound to be attenuated.
2 The Model
We use a relatively standard medium-scale New Keynesian model as a framework of reference. Crucially,
the model features elements that generate a cost to inflation: (1) nominal rigidities, in the form of staggered
price and wage setting; (2) less than perfect price (and wage) indexation to past or trend inflation; and (3)
trend productivity growth, to which wages are imperfectly indexed.
As is well known, staggered price setting generates a positive relation between deviations from zero in-
flation and price dispersion (with the resulting inefficient allocation of resources). Also, and ceteris paribus,
price inflation induces (nominal) wage inflation, which in turn triggers inefficient wage dispersion in the
presence of staggered wage setting. Partial indexation also magnifies the costs of non-zero price (or wage)
inflation as compared to a set-up where price and wages mechanically catch up with trend inflation (Ascari
and Sbordone 2014). Finally the lack of a systematic indexation of wages to productivity also induces an
inefficient wage dispersion.
At the same time, there are benefits associated to a positive inflation rate, as interest rates are subject to
a ZLB constraint. In particular, and given the steady-state real interest rate, the incidence of binding ZLB
episodes and the associated macroeconomic volatiity should decline with the average rate of inflation.
Overall, the model we use, and the implied trade-off between costs and benefits of steady-state infla-
tion, are close to those considered by Coibion et al. (2012). However we assume Calvo-style sticky wages,
in addition to sticky prices.7
6They document that the cross-sector dispersion in the size of price changes is similar in the current, low inflation, period as
in the high inflation period of the late 1970’s. If Calvo was the relevant pricing frictions, the dispersion in size of price changes
should have been much larger in the high inflation period than today.
7In their robustness analysis, Coibion et al. (2012) consider downward nominal wage rigidity, which entails different mecha-
nisms than with Calvo-style rigidities.
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2.1 Households
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of measure one of infinitely-lived, identical households. The
representative household is composed of a continuum of workers, each specialized in a particular labor
type indexed by h ∈ [0, 1]. The representative household’s objective is to maximize an intertemporal
welfare function
Et
∞
∑
s=0
βs
{
eζg,t+s log(Ct+s − ηCt+s−1)− χ1+ ν
∫ 1
0
Nt+s(h)1+νdh
}
, (1)
where β ≡ e−ρ is the discount factor (ρ being the discount rate), Et{·} is the expectation operator con-
ditional on information available at time t, Ct is consumption and Nt(h) is the supply of labor of type h.
The utility function features habit formation, with degree of habits η. The inverse Frisch elasticity of labor
supply is ν and χ is a scale parameter for labor disutility. The utility derived from consumption is subject
to a preference shock ζg,t.
The representative household maximizes (1) subject to the sequence of constraints
PtCt + eζq,t QtBt ≤
∫ 1
0
Wt(h)Nt(h)dh + Bt−1 − Tt + Dt (2)
where Pt is the aggregate price level, Wt(h) is the nominal wage rate associated with labor of type h, eζq,t Qt
is the price at t of a one-period nominal bond paying one unit of currency in the next period, where ζq,t is
a “risk-premium” shock, Bt is the quantity of such bonds acquired at t, Tt denotes lump-sum taxes, and Dt
stands for the dividends rebated to the households by monopolistic firms.
2.2 Firms and Price Setting
The final good is produced by perfectly competitive firms according to the Dixit-Stiglitz production func-
tion
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt( f )(θp−1)/θp d f
)θp/(θp−1)
,
where Yt is the quantity of final good produced at t, Yt( f ) is the input of intermediate good f , and θp the
elasticity of substitution between any two intermediate goods. The zero-profit condition yields the relation
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt( f )1−θp d f
)1/(1−θp)
.
Intermediate goods are produced by monopolistic firms, each specialized in a particular good f ∈ [0, 1].
Firm f has technology
Yt( f ) = ZtLt( f )1/φ
where Lt( f ) is the input of aggregate labor, 1/φ is the elasticity of production with respect to aggregate
labor, and Zt is an index of aggregate productivity. The latter evolves according to
Zt = Zt−1eµz+ζz,t
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where µz is the average growth rate of productivity. Thus, technology is characterized by a unit root in the
model.
Intermediate goods producers are subject to nominal rigidities à la Calvo. Formally, firms face a con-
stant probability αp of not being able to re-optimize prices. In the event that firm f is not drawn to re-
optimize at t, it re-scales its price according to the indexation rule
Pt( f ) = (Πt−1)γp Pt−1( f )
where Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1, Π is the associated steady-state value and 0 ≤ γp < 1. Thus, in case firm f is
not drawn to re-optimize, it mechanically re-scales its price by past inflation. Importantly, however, we
assume that the degree of indexation is less than perfect since γp < 1. One obvious drawback of the Calvo
set-up is that the probability of price reoptimization is assumed to be invariant, inter alia to the long run
inflation rate. Drawing from the logic of menu cost models, the Calvo parameter of price stickiness could
be expected to endogenously decrease when trend inflation rises. However, in the range of values for trend
inflation that we will consider, available micro economic evidence, such as that summarized in Golosov
and Lucas (2007), suggests there is no significant correlation between the frequency of price change and
trend inflation.
If drawn to re-optimize in period t, a firms chooses P?t in order to maximize
Et
∞
∑
s=0
(βαp)
sΛt+s
{
(1+ τp,t+s)
Vpt,t+sP
?
t
Pt+s
Yt,t+s − Wt+sPt+s
(
Yt,t+s
Zt+s
)φ}
,
where Λt denotes the marginal utility of wealth, τp,t is a sales subsidy paid to firms and financed via a
lump-sum tax on households, and Yt,t+s is the demand function that a monopolist who last revised its
price at t faces at t + s; it obeys
Yt,t+s =
(
Vpt,t+sP
?
t
Pt+s
)−θp
Yt+s
where Vpt,t+s reflects the compounded effects of price indexation to past inflation
Vpt,t+s =
t+s−1
∏
j=t
(Πj)γp .
We further assume that
1+ τp,t = (1+ τp)e−ζu,t ,
with ζu,t appearing in the system as a cost-push shock. Furthermore, we set τp so as to neutralize the
steady-state distortion induced by price markups.
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2.3 Aggregate Labor and Wage Setting
There is a continuum of perfectly competitive labor aggregating firms that mix the specialized labor types
according to the CES technology
Nt =
(∫ 1
0
Nt(h)(θw−1)/θw dh
)θw/(θw−1)
,
where Nt is the quantity of aggregate labor and Nt(h) is the input of labor of type h, and where θw denotes
the elasticity of substitution between any two labor types. Aggregate labor Nt is then used as an input in
the production of intermediate goods. Equilibrium in the labor market thus requires
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Lt( f )d f .
Here, it is important to notice the difference between Lt( f ), the demand for aggregate labor emanating
from firm f , and Nt(h), the supply of labor of type h by the representative household.
The zero-profit condition yields the relation
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
Wt(h)1−θw dh
)1/(1−θw)
,
where Wt is the nominal wage paid to aggregate labor while Wt(h) is the nominal wage paid to labor of
type h.
Mirroring prices, we assume that wages are subject to nominal rigidities, à la Calvo, in the manner of
Erceg et al. (2000). Formally, unions face a constant probability αw of not being able to re-optimize wages.
In the event that union h is not drawn to re-optimize at t, it re-scales its wage according to the indexation
rule
Wt(h) = eγzµz(Πt−1)γwWt−1(h)
where, as before, wages are indexed to past inflation. However, we assume that the degree of indexation is
here too less than perfect by imposing 0 ≤ γw < 1. In addition, nominal wages are also indexed to average
productivity growth with indexation degree 0 ≤ γz < 1.
If drawn to re-optimize in period t, a union chooses W?t in order to maximize
Et
∞
∑
s=0
(βαw)
s
{
(1+ τw)Λt+s
Vwt,t+sW
?
t
Pt+s
Nt,t+s − χ1+ νN
1+v
t,t+s
}
where the demand function at t + s facing a union who last revised its wage at t obeys
Nt,t+s =
(
Vwt,t+sW
?
t
Wt+s
)−θw
Nt+s
and where Vwt,t+s reflects the compounded effects of wage indexation to past inflation and average produc-
tivity growth
Vwt,t+s = e
γzµz(t+s)
t+s−1
∏
j=t
(Πj)γw .
Furthermore, we set τw so as to neutralize the steady-state distortion induced by wage markups.
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2.4 Monetary Policy and the ZLB
Monetary policy in "normal times" is assumed to be given by an inertial Taylor-like interest rate rule
ıˆt = ρi ıˆt−1 + (1− ρi)
(
apipˆit + ay xˆt
)
+ ζR,t (3)
where it ≡ − log(Qt), with ıˆt denoting the associated deviation from steady state i.e, ıˆt ≡ it − i. Also,
pit ≡ logΠt, pˆit ≡ pit − pi is the gap between inflation and its target, and xˆt ≡ log(Yt/Ynt ) where Ynt is
the efficient level of output, defined as the level of output that would prevail in an economy with flexible
prices and wages and no cost-push shocks. Finally, ζR,t is a monetary policy shock.
Importantly, we interpret pi as the central bank target for change in the price index. An annual inflation
target of 2% would thus imply pi = 2/400 = 0.005 as the model will be parameterized and estimated with
quarterly data. Note that the inflation target thus defined may differ from average inflation.
Crucially for our purposes, the nominal interest rate it is subject to a ZLB constraint:
it ≥ 0
The steady-state level of the real interest rate is defined by r? ≡ i − pi. Given logarithmic utility, it is
related to technology and preference parameters according to r? = ρ+ µz. Combining these elements, it is
convenient to write the ZLB constraint in terms of deviations from steady state
ıˆt ≥ −(µz + ρ+ pi) (4)
The rule effectively implemented is given by:
ıˆt = max{ıˆnt , −(µz + ρ+ pi)}, (5)
where
ıˆnt = ρi ıˆ
n
t−1 + (1− ρi)
(
apipˆit + ay xˆt
)
+ ζR,t, (6)
with int denoting the shadow or notional rate, i.e. the one that would be effective in the absence of the ZLB
constraint. Thus the lagged rate that matters is the lagged notional interest rate, rather than the lagged
actual rate. In making that assumption we follow Coibion et al. (2012) and a large share of the recent
literature.
Before proceeding, several remarks are in order. First note that realized inflation might be on average
below the target pi as a consequence of ZLB episodes, i.e. E{pit} < pi. In such instances of ZLB, monetary
policy fails to deliver the appropriate degree of accommodation, resulting in a more severe recession and
lower inflation than in an economy with no ZLB constraint.8
8For convenience, Table A.1 in the Appendix summarizes the various notions of optimal inflation and long-run or target
inflation considered in this paper.
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Second, we assume the central bank policy is characterized by simple interest rate rule rather than a
Ramsey-type fully optimal policy of the type studied by e.g. Khan et al. (2003) or Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2010). Such rules have been shown to be a good empirical characterization of the behavior of central banks
in the last decades. Moreover two features in our set-up, the inertia in the monetary policy rule, as well as
the use of a lagged notional rate rather than a lagged actual rate, render the policy more persistent and thus
closer to a Ramsey-like fully optimal interest rate rule. In particular the dependence on the lagged notional
rate ıˆnt results in the nominal interest rate ıˆt being “lower for longer” in the aftermath of ZLB episodes (as
ıˆnt will stay negative for a protracted period). In Section 6, we study how alternative strategies of “lower
for longer” affect the (r?,pi?) relation.
As equation (4) makes clear, µz, ρ, pi enter symmetrically in the ZLB constraint. Put another way, for
given structural parameters and a given process for ıˆt, the probability of hitting the ZLB would remain
unchanged if productivity growth or the discount rate decline by one percent and the inflation target is
increased by a commensurate amount at the same time. Based on these observations, one may be tempted
to argue that in response to a permanent decline in µz or ρ, the optimal inflation target pi∗ must necessarily
change by the same amount (with a negative sign).
The previous conjecture is, however, incorrect. The reasons for this are twofold. First, any change
in µz (or ρ) also translates into a change in the coefficients of the equilibrium dynamic system. It turns
out that this effect is non-negligible since, as our later results imply, after a one percentage point decline
in r∗ the inflation target has to be raised by more than one percent in order to keep the probability of
hitting the ZLB unchanged. Second, because there are welfare costs associated with increasing the inflation
target, the policy maker would also have to balance the benefits of keeping the incidence of ZLB episodes
constant with the additional costs in terms of extra price dispersion and inefficient resource allocation.
These costs can be substantial and may more than offset the benefits of holding the probability of ZLB
constant. Assessing these forces is precisely this paper’s endeavor.
3 Estimation and Simulations
3.1 Estimation without a Lower Bound on Nominal Interest Rates
We estimate the model using data for a pre-crisis period over which the ZLB constraint is not binding. This
enables us to use the linear version of the model.9
Estimation Procedure. Because the model has a stochastic trend, we first induce stationarity by dividing
trending variables by Zt. The resulting system is then log-linearized in the neighborhood of its determin-
istic steady state.10 We append to the system a set of equations describing the dynamics of the structural
9See Gust et al. (2017) and Lindé et al. (2017) for alternative methods which deal with the ZLB constraint at the estimatin stage.
10See the appendix for further details.
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shocks, namely
ζk,t = ρkζk,t−1 + σkek,t, ek,t ∼ N(0, 1)
for k ∈ {R, g, u, q, z}.
Absent the ZLB constraint, the model can be solved and cast into the usual linear transition and obser-
vation equations:
st = T (θ)st−1 +R(θ)et, xt =M(θ) +H(θ)st,
with st a vector collecting the model’s state variables, xt a vector of observable variables and et a vector of
innovations to the shock processes et = (eR,t, eg,t, eu,t, eq,t, ez,t)′. The solution coefficients are regrouped in
the conformable matrices T (θ), R(θ),M(θ), and H(θ) which depend on the vector of structural parame-
ters θ.
The sample of observable variables is XT ≡ {xt}Tt=1 with
xt = [∆ log(GDPt),∆ log(GDP Deflatort),∆ log(Wagest), Short Term Interest Ratet]
′
where the short term nominal interest rate is the effective Fed Funds Rate. We use a sample of quarterly
data covering the period 1985Q2-2008Q3.11 This choice is guided by two objectives. First, this sample
strikes a balance between size and the concern of having a homogeneous monetary policy regime over
the period considered. The sample covers the Volcker and post-Volcker period, arguably one of relative
homogeneity of monetary policy. Second, we use a sample that coincides more or less with the so-called
Great Moderation. Over the latter, as has been argued in the literature, we expect smaller shocks to hit the
economy. In principle, this will lead to a conservative assessment of the effects of the more stringent ZLB
constraint due to lower real interest rates.
The parameters φ, θp, and θw are calibrated prior to estimation. The parameter θp is set to 6, resulting
in a steady-state price markup of 20%. Similarly, the parameter θw is set to 3, resulting in a wage markup
of 50%. These numbers fall into the arguably large ballpark of available values used in the literature. In a
robustness section, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to these parameters. The parameter φ is set
to 1/0.7. Given the assumed subsidy correcting the steady-state price markup distortion, this results in a
steady-state labor share of 70%.
We rely on a full-system Bayesian estimation approach to estimate the remaining model parameters.
After having cast the dynamic system in the state-space representation for the set of observable variables,
we use the Kalman filter to measure the likelihood of the observed variables. We then form the joint
posterior distribution of the structural parameters by combining the likelihood function p(XT|θ) with a
joint density characterizing some prior beliefs p(θ). The joint posterior distribution thus obeys
p(θ|XT) ∝ p(XT|θ)p(θ),
11The data are obtained from the Fred database. GDP is expressed in per capita terms.
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Table 1: Estimation Results
Parameter Prior Shape Prior Mean Priod std Post. Mean Post. std Low High
ρ Normal 0.20 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.11 0.27
µz Normal 0.44 0.05 0.43 0.04 0.36 0.50
pi? Normal 0.61 0.05 0.62 0.05 0.54 0.69
αp Beta 0.66 0.05 0.67 0.03 0.61 0.73
αw Beta 0.66 0.05 0.50 0.05 0.43 0.58
γp Beta 0.50 0.15 0.20 0.07 0.08 0.32
γw Beta 0.50 0.15 0.44 0.16 0.21 0.68
γz Beta 0.50 0.15 0.50 0.18 0.26 0.75
η Beta 0.70 0.15 0.80 0.03 0.75 0.85
ν Gamma 1.00 0.20 0.73 0.15 0.47 0.97
api Gamma 2.00 0.15 2.13 0.15 1.89 2.38
ay Gamma 0.50 0.05 0.50 0.05 0.42 0.58
ρTR Beta 0.85 0.10 0.85 0.02 0.82 0.89
σz Inverse Gamma 0.25 1.00 1.06 0.22 0.74 1.38
σR Inverse Gamma 0.25 1.00 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.11
σq Inverse Gamma 0.25 1.00 0.39 0.11 0.16 0.61
σg Inverse Gamma 0.25 1.00 0.23 0.04 0.16 0.29
σu Inverse Gamma 0.25 1.00 0.24 0.05 0.06 0.46
ρR Beta 0.25 0.10 0.51 0.06 0.41 0.61
ρz Beta 0.25 0.10 0.27 0.13 0.09 0.45
ρg Beta 0.85 0.10 0.98 0.01 0.97 1.00
ρq Beta 0.85 0.10 0.88 0.04 0.80 0.95
ρu Beta 0.80 0.10 0.80 0.10 0.65 0.96
Note: ’std’ stands for Standard Deviation, ’Post.’ stands for Posterior, and ’Low’ and ’High’ denote the bounds of the 90%
probability interval for the posterior distribution.
Given the specification of the model, the joint posterior distribution cannot be recovered analytically
but may be computed numerically, using a Monte-Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) sampling approach. More
specifically, we rely on the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to obtain a random draw of size 1,000,000 from
the joint posterior distribution of the parameters.
Estimation Results. Table 1 reports the parameter’s postulated priors (type of distribution, mean, and
standard error) and estimation results, i.e., the posterior mean and standard deviation, together with the
bounds of the 90% probability interval for each parameter.
For the parameters pi, µz and ρ, we impose Gaussian prior distributions. The parameters governing the
latter are chosen so that the model steady-state values match the mean values of inflation, real per capita
GDP growth, and the real interest rate in our US sample. Our choice of priors for the other parameters are
standard. In particular, we use Beta distributions for parameters in [0, 1], Gamma distributions for positive
parameters, and Inverse Gamma distributions for the standard error of the structural shocks.
Most of our estimated parameters are in line with the calibration adopted by Coibion et al. (2012), with
important qualifications. First, we obtain a slightly higher degree of price rigidity than theirs (0.67 versus
0.55). Second, our specification of monetary policy is different from theirs. In particular, they allow for
two lags of the nominal interest rate in the monetary policy rule while we only have one lag. However,
we can compare the overall degree of interest rate smoothing in the two setups. To this end, abstracting
from the other elements of the rule, we simply focus on the sum of autoregressive coefficients. It amounts
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to 0.92 in their calibration while the degree of smoothing in our setup has a mean posterior value of 0.85.
While this might not seem to be a striking difference, it is useful to cast these figures in terms of half-life of
convergence in the context of autoregressive model of order 1. Our value implies twice as small a half-life
than theirs. Third, our monetary policy shock and our shocks to demand have approximately twice as small
an unconditional standard deviation as theirs. Finally, we estimate the degree of indexation to past inflation
rather than setting it to zero as in Coibion et al. (2012). We find small though non-zero degrees of indexation
to past inflation. This will translate into a higher tolerance for inflation in our subsequent analysis of the
optimal inflation target. This is because a higher indexation helps to mitigate the distortions induced by a
higher inflation target. However, it turns out that, given these estimates, this effect is quantitatively small.
Properties of the estimated model, such as e.g. the response to a monetary policy shock, are standard
(see the Appendix, section B. The appendix also illustrates the “lower for longer” property embedded in
the policy rule).
3.2 Computing the Optimal Inflation Target
Simulations with a ZLB constraint. The model becomes non-linear when one allows the ZLB constraint
to bind. The solution method we implement follows the approach developed by Bodenstein et al. (2009)
and Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015). The approach can be described as follows. There are two regimes: the
no-ZLB regime k = n and the ZLB regime k = e and the canonical representation of the system in each
regime is
Et{A(k)st+1 + B(k)st + C(k)st−1 +D(k)et}+ f (k) = 0
where st is a vector collecting all the model’s variables, A(k), B(k), C(k), and D(k) are conformable matrices
and f (k) is a vector of constants. In the no-ZLB regime, the vector f (n) is filled with zeros. In the ZLB
regime, the row of f (e) associated with it is equal to µz + ρ+ pi. Similarly, the rows of the system matrices
associated with it in the no-ZLB regime correspond to the coefficients of the Taylor rule while in the ZLB
regime, the coefficient associated with it is equal to 1 and all the other coefficients are set to zero.
In each period t, given an initial state vector st−1 and vector stochastic innovations et, we simulate
the model under perfect foresight (i.e., assuming that no further shocks hit the economy) over the next N
periods, for N sufficiently large. In case this particular draw is not conducive to a ZLB episode, we find
st using the linear solution stated above. In contrast, if this draw leads to a ZLB episode, we postulate
integers Ne < N and Nx < N such that the ZLB is reached at time t + Ne and left at time t + Nx. In this
case, we solve the model by backward induction. We obtain the time varying solution
st+q = dt+q + Tt+qst+q−1 +Rt+qet+q
where, for q ∈ {Ne, ..., Nx − 1}
Tt+q = −
(
A(e)Tt+q+1 + B(e)
)−1
C(e), Rt+q = −
(
A(e)Tt+q+1 + B(e)
)−1
D(e),
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dt+q = −
(
A(e)Tt+q+1 + B(e)
)−1(
A(e)dt+q+1 + f (e)
)
and, for q ∈ {0, ..., Ne − 1}
Tt+q = −
(
A(n)Tt+q+1 + B(n)
)−1
C(n), Rt+q = −
(
A(n)Tt+q+1 + B(n)
)−1
D(n),
dt+q = −
(
A(n)Tt+q+1 + B(n)
)−1(
A(n)dt+q+1 + f (n)
)
,
using Tt+Nx = T , Rt+Nx = R, and dt+Nx set to a column filled with zeros as initial conditions of the
backward recursion.
We then check that given the obtained solution, the system hits the ZLB at t+ Ne and leaves the ZLB at
t+ Nx. Otherwise, we shift Ne and/or Nx forward or backward by one period and start all over again until
convergence. Once convergence has been reached, we use the resulting matrices to compute st and repeat
the process for all the simulation periods.
Our approach is thus similar to the one used by Coibion et al. (2012) in their study of the optimal
inflation target in a New Keynesian setup.12 A shortcoming of this approach is that the agents in the model
are assumed to believe that the ZLB will not bind again in the future, once the current ZLB episode comes to
an end. This may bias estimates, as explained by in Gust et al. (2017), even when, as in our case, estimation
is performed on a pre-ZLB period. The scope of this concern is however dampened by the fact that in the
pre crisis environment there is evidence that even experts severely underestimated the probability of the
ZLB occuring, see Chung et al. (2012).13
A welfare-based optimal inflation target. A second-order approximation of the household expected util-
ity derived from the structural model is used to quantify welfare, in a similar manner as in Woodford
(2003), assuming a small steady-state inflation rate. As detailed in the Technical Appendix this second
order approximation is given by:
U0 = −12
1− βη
1− η E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
{
λy[xˆt − δxˆt−1 + (1− δ)x¯]2 + λp[(1− γp)pi + pˆit − γppˆit−1]2
+ λw[(1− γz)µz + (1− γw)pi + pˆiw,t − γwpˆit−1]2
}
+ t.i.p+O(||ζ,pi||3),
12In practice we combine the implementation of the Bodenstein et al. (2009) algorithm developed by Coibion et al. (2012) with
the solution algorithm and the parser from Dynare. Our implementation is in the spirit of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), resulting
in a less user-friendly yet faster suite of programs.
13Global solution methods, such as advocated and implemented by Gust et al. (2017) are in principle more accurate. However,
given the size of our model, and the large set of inflation targets and real interest rates that we need to consider (and given
that these have to be considered for each and every parameter configuration in our simulations), a global solution would be
computationally prohibitive.
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where t.i.p collects terms that are independent of monetary policy and O(||ζ,pi||3) denotes residual terms
of order 3, with ||ζ,pi|| denoting a bound on the amplitude of exogenous shocks and the inflation target.
Parameters λy λp, λw are effectively weights on an output gap term, a price inflation term, and a wage
inflation term. Parameter δ fulfills 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. The parameter x¯ is the log ratio of steady-state output to
efficient output. x¯ is zero either when trend inflation and trend productivity growth are zero, or when
indexation is full, and negative otherwise (in which case, output is inefficiently low). Finally, λy λp, λw, δ,
and x¯ are function of the structural parameters θ.
We letW (pi; θ) denote this welfare criterion, to emphasize that welfare depends on the inflation target pi
together with the rest of the structural parameters θ. Two cases are considered concerning the latter. In the
baseline case, the structural parameters θ are fixed at reference values and taken to be known with certainty
by the policy maker. In an alternative exercise, the policy maker maximizes welfare while recognizing the
uncertainty associated with the model’s parameters.
The optimal inflation target associated with a given vector of parameters θ, pi?(θ) is approximated
via numerical simulations of the model allowing for an occasionally binding ZLB constraint, using the
algorithm outlined above.14 The optimal inflation rate associated to a given vector of parameters θ is then
obtained as the one maximizing the welfare function, that is:
pi?(θ) ≡ arg max
pi
W (pi; θ).
Given parameter estimates at posterior mean we can compute the weight on output and wage inflation
relative to inflation, i.e. λy/λp and λw/λp). These relative weights are respectively equal to 0.22 and 0.10.15
Note these values are in the ballpark of values obtained in analyses of optimal inflation based on welfare
criteria.
3.3 Some Properties of Loss Function and the Optimal Inflation Target in the Estimated Model
This section presents selected properties of the model related to the optimal inflation target. Figure 1
displays the welfare function – expressed as losses relative to the maximum social welfare – associated
with three natural benchmarks for the parameter vector θ: the posterior mean (dark blue line), the median
(light blue line), and the mode (lighter blue line). For convenience, the peak of each welfare function is
identified with a dot of the same color. Also, to facilitate interpretations, the inflation targets are expressed
in annualized percentage rates.
14More precisely, a sample of size T = 100000 of innovations {et}Tt=1 is drawn from a Gaussian distribution (we also allow for
a burn in sample of 200 points that we later discard). We use these shocks to simulate the model for given parameter vector θ.
The welfare function W (pi; θ) is approximated by replacing expectations with sample averages. The procedure is repeated for
each of K = 51 inflation targets on the grid {pi(k)}Kk=1 ranging from pi = (0.5/4)% to pi = (5/4)% (expressed in quarterly rates).
Importantly, we use the exact same sequence of shocks {et}Tt=1 in each and every simulation over the inflation grid.
15The absolute value of λp is found to be 130.52.
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Figure 1: Welfare and the Inflation Target
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Note: Blue: parameters set at the posterior mean; light blue: parameters set at the posterior median; Lighter blue: parameters set
at the posterior mode. pi? ≡ log(Π?). In all cases, the welfare functions are normalized so as to peak at 0.
As Figure 1 illustrates, the US optimal inflation target is close to 2% and varies between 1.85% and
2.21% depending on which indicator of central tendency (mean, mode, or median) is selected. This range
of values is consistent with the ones of Coibion et al. (2012) even though in the present paper it is derived
from an estimated model over a much shorter sample.16 Importantly, while the larger shocks in Coibion
et al. (2012) ceteris paribus induce larger inflation targets, the high degree of interest rate smoothing in
their analysis works in the other direction (as documented below in the last section) .
To complement on these illustrative results, Figure 2 displays the probability of reaching the ZLB as a
function of the annualized inflation target (again, with the parameter vector θ evaluated at the posterior
mean, median, and mode). For convenience, the circles in each curve mark the corresponding optimal
inflation target.
The probability of hitting the ZLB associated to these positive optimal inflation targets is relatively low,
at about 6%. This result, as anticipated above, is the mere reflection of our choice of a Great Moderation
sample. At the same time, our model is able to predict a fairly spread out distribution of ZLB episodes
durations, with a significant fraction of ZLB episodes lasting more than say five years (see figure in the
appendix D). Given the existence of a single ZLB episode in the recent history, we do not attempt here to
take a stand on what is a relevant distribution of ZLB episodes (see Dordal-i-Carreras et al. 2016 for further
16Coibion et al. (2012) calibrate their model on a post-WWII, pre-Great Recession US sample. By contrast, we use a Great
Moderation sample.
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Figure 2: Probability of ZLB
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Note: Blue: parameters set at the posterior mean; light blue: parameters set at the posterior median; Lighter blue: parameters set
at the posterior mode. pi? ≡ log(Π?).
analysis in that direction).
4 The Optimal Inflation Target and the Steady State Real Interest Rate
The focus of this section is to investigate how the monetary authority should adjust its optimal inflation
target pi? in response to changes in the steady-state real interest rate, r?.17 Intuitively, with a lower r? the
ZLB is bound to bind more often, so one would expect a higher inflation target should be desirable in
that case. But the answer to the practical question of by how much should the target be increased is not
obvious. Indeed, the benefit of providing a better hedge against hitting the ZLB, which is an infrequent
event, comes at a cost of higher steady-state inflation which induces permanent costs, as argued by, e.g.,
Bernanke (2016).
To start with, we compute the relation linking the optimal inflation target to the steady-state real interest
rate, based on simulations of the estimated model and ignoring parameter uncertainty. We show that the
link between pi? and r? depends to some extent on the factor underlying a variation in r?, i.e. a change in the
discount rate ρ or a change in growth rate of technology µz. In our set-up the first scenario roughly captures
17Note our exercise here is different from assessing what would be the optimal response to a time-varying steady state – a
specification consistent with econometric work like that of Holston et al. (2017). Our exercise is arguably consistent with “secular
stagnation” understood as a permanently lower real rate of interest – while doing without having to assume a unit root process
in the real rate of interest.
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the “taste for safe asset” and “ageing population” rationale for secular stagnation, while the second one
captures the “decline in technological progress” rationale . Subsequently, we investigate how the relation
between the optimal inflation target and the steady-state real interest rate depends on various features of
the monetary policy framework, as well as on the size of shocks or on the steady-state price and wage
mark-ups.
4.1 The Baseline (r?,pi?) Relation
To characterize the link between r? and pi?, the following simulation exercise is conducted. The structural
parameter vector θ is fixed at its posterior mean, θ¯, with the exception of µz and ρ. These two parameters
are varied – each in turn, keeping the other parameter, µz or ρ, fixed at its baseline posterior mean value
(namely 0.76% and 1.72%, respectively, in annualized terms). For both µz and ρ, we consider values on
a grid ranging from 0.4% to 10% in annualized percentage terms. The model is then simulated for each
possible values of µz or ρ and various values of inflation targets pi using the procedure as before.18 The
optimal value pi? associated to each value of r? is obtained as the one maximizing the welfare criterion
W (pi; θ).
We finally obtain two curves. The first one links the optimal inflation target pi? to the steady-state real
interest rate r? for various growth rate of technology µz: pi?(r?(µz)), where the notation r?(µz) highlights
that the steady-state real interest rate varies as µz varies. The second one links the optimal inflation target
pi? to the steady-state real interest rate r? for various discount rates ρ: pi?(r?(ρ)). Here, the notation r?(ρ)
highlights that the steady-state real interest rate varies as ρ varies.19
Figure 3 depicts the (r?,pi?) relations thus obtained. The blue dots correspond to the case when the real
steady-state interest rate r? varies with µz. The red dots correspond to the case when the real steady-state
interest rate r? varies with ρ. For convenience, both the real interest rate and the associated optimal inflation
target are expressed in annualized percentage rates. The dashed grey lines indicate the benchmark result
corresponding to the optimal inflation target at the posterior mean of the structural parameter distribution.
These results are complemented with Figure 4 that shows the relation between r? and the probability
of hitting the ZLB, evaluated at the optimal inflation target. As with Figure 3, blue dots correspond to the case
when r? varies with µz, while red dots correspond to the case when it varies with ρ.20
As expected, the relations in Figure 3 is decreasing. However, the slope varies with the value of r?.
18In particular, we use the same sequence of shocks {et}Tt=1 as used in the computation implemented in the baseline exercises
of Section 3.2. Here again, we start from the same grid of inflation targets for all the possible values of µz or ρ. Then, for each
value of µz or ρ, we refine the inflation grid over successive passes until the optimal inflation target associated with a particular
value of µz or ρ proves insensitive to the grid.
19Figures G.1 and G.2 report similar results at the posterior mode and at the posterior median. Figure H.1 documents the
relation in terms of “optimal nominal interest rate”.
20Figure H.1 in Appendix shows the relation between r? and the nominal interest rate when the inflation target is set at its
optimal value.
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Figure 3: (r?,pi?) locus (at the posterior mean)
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Note: the blue dots correspond to the (r?,pi?) locus when r? varies with µz; the red dots correspond to the (r?,pi?) locus when r?
varies with ρ
The slope is relatively large in absolute value – although smaller than one – for moderate values of r? (say
below 4 percent). The slope declines in absolute value as r? increases: Lowering the inflation target to
compensate for an increase in r? becomes less and less desirable. This reflects the fact that, as r? increases,
the probability of hitting the ZLB becomes smaller and smaller. For very large r? values, the probability
becomes almost zero, as Figure 4 shows.
At some point, the optimal inflation target becomes insensitive to changes in r? when the latter originate
from changes in the discount rate ρ. In this case, the inflation target stabilizes at a slightly negative value,
in order to lower the nominal wage inflation rate required to support positive productivity growth, given
the imperfect indexation of nominal wages to productivity. At the steady state, the real wage must grow
at a rate of µz. It is optimal to obtain this steady-state growth as the result of a moderate nominal wage
increase and a moderate price decrease, rather than the result of a zero price inflation and a consequently
larger nominal wage inflation.21
The previous tension is even more apparent when r? varies with µz since, in this case, the effects of
21For very large r?, as a rough approximation, we can ignore the effects of shocks and assume that the ZLB is a zero-mass
event. Assuming also a negligible difference between steady-state and efficient outputs and letting λp and λw denote the weights
attached to price dispersion and wage dispersion, respectively, in the approximated welfare function, the optimal inflation obeys
pi? ≈ −λw(1− γz)(1− γw)/[λp(1− γp)2 + λw(1− γw)2]µz. Given the low values of λw resulting from our estimation, it is not
surprising that pi? is negative but close to zero. See Amano et al. (2009) for a similar point in the context of a model abstracting
from ZLB issues.
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Figure 4: Relation between probability of ZLB at optimal inflation and r? (at the posterior mean)
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Note: the blue dots correspond to the (r?,pi?) locus when r? varies with µz; the red dots correspond to the (r?,pi?) locus when r?
varies with ρ
imperfect indexation of wages to productivity are magnified given that a higher µz calls for a higher growth
in the real wage, which is optimally attained through greater price deflation, as well as a higher wage
inflation. Notice however that even in this case, the optimal inflation target becomes little sensitive to
changes in r? for very large values of r?, typically above 6%.
For low values of r∗, on the other hand, the slope of the curve is steeper. In particular, in the empirically
relevant region, the relation is not far from one-to-one. More precisely, it shows that, starting from the
posterior mean estimate of θ, a 100 basis points decline in r? should lead to a +99 basis points increase in
pi?. Importantly, this increase in the optimal inflation target is virtually the same no matter the underlying
factor causing the change in r?: a drop in potential growth, µz, or a decrease in the discount factor, ρ.
At the same time, the ZLB incidence evaluated at the optimal inflation rate also increases when the real
rate decreases. At some point, the speed at which this probability increases slows down, reflecting that the
social planner would choose to increase the inflation target as needed so as to avoid a higher ZLB incidence.
Figure 5 shows how the probability of ZLB changes as a function of r?, holding the inflation target con-
stant. We first set the inflation target at its optimal baseline value (i.e., the value computed at the posterior
mean, 2.21%). This is reported as the brown dots. Similarly, we also compute an analog relation assuming,
this time, that the inflation target is held constant at the optimal value consistent with a steady-state real
interest rate one percentage point lower (thus, inflation is set to 3.20 ). Here again, the other parameters
are set at their posterior mean. This corresponds to the green dots in the figure. For convenience, we
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Figure 5: Relation between probability of ZLB and r? (at the posterior mean)
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Note: The blue dots correspond to the relation linking r? and the probability of ZLB, holding the optimal inflation target pi? at the
baseline value. The red dots correspond the same relation when the optimal inflation target pi? is set at the value consistent with a
steady-state real interest rate one percentage point lower. The pink dots correspond to the probability of ZLB obtained under the
optimal inflation target pi? associated to a given value of r?.
also report the the probability of hitting the ZLB as a function of r? conditional on adjusting optimally the
inflation target, as in Figure 4. This corresponds to the blue dots.
Consider first the brown curve. At the level of the real interest rate prevailing before the permanent
decline, assuming that the Central Bank sets its target to the associated optimal level, the probability of
reaching the ZLB would be slightly below 6%. Imagine now that the real interest rates experiences a decline
of 100 basis points. Keeping the inflation target at the same level as prior to the shock, the probability of
reaching the ZLB would now climb up to approximately 11%. However, the change in the optimal inflation
target brings the probability of reaching the ZLB back to approximately 6%. Thus, the social planner would
almost neutralize the effects of the natural rate decline on the probability of hitting the ZLB.
Finally we investigate whether the trade-off analyzed above translates into meaningful welfare costs,
measured in terms of foregone per-period consumption. Results are reported in Appendix F. It turns out
that, under sufficiently low r? values, agents faced with a 1 pp decline in the steady-state real interest rates
would require up to a 1.5 percentage point increase in consumption to be as well-off under the former
optimal inflation target (i.e. 2.21%) as under the optimal target associated with the lower real interest rate
(3.20% in this case). In other words, the welfare costs of not adjusting the target in the face of a decline in
r? are substantial.
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4.2 Robustness to Alternatives Structural Assumptions
In this section, we investigate the robustness of the (r?,pi?) relation to altering (or modifying) some struc-
tural features of the environment. We consider several relevant dimensions: the case of larger shocks, and
alternative calibrations for the steady-state price and wage mark-up, and changes in the degree of price
and wage indexation.22
Larger Shocks. As argued before, the model is estimated using data from the Great Moderation period.
One may legitimately argue that the decline in the real interest rate resulting from the secular stagnation
has come hand in hand with larger shocks, as the Great Recession suggests. To address this concern,
we simulate the model assuming that demand shocks have a standard deviation 30 percent larger than
estimated.
We conduct this exercise assuming that changes in average productivity growth µz are the only driver of
changes in the natural rate. Apart from σq and σg, which are re-scaled, all the other parameters are frozen at
their posterior mean. Given this setup, the optimal inflation target is 3.7% as opposed to 2.21% conditional
on the baseline value of r?. Also, under the alternative shock configuration, the probability of hitting
the ZLB is 5.3%, as opposed to 5.5% in the baseline. These probabilities may seem low, especially in the
case of large shocks which we argue capture Great Recession-like shocks . However they are particularly
low because the inflation target is chosen optimally in this set-up. In particular, in the larger shocks case,
the increase in the inflation target is large enough to offset the impact of larger shocks in terms of ZLB
incidence. When instead we keep the inflation target unchanged, the probability of hitting the ZLB rises to
18% in the face of a 1% decline in r?.23 In that case, these ZLB probabilities come close to the probabilities
reported by Kiley and Roberts (2017) in the case of their DSGE model (albeit they find a higher probability
of ZLB, of the order of 30% when using the FRS/US model), or by Chung et al. (2019). 24
Figure 6 reports the (r?,pi?) relation under larger demand shocks (red dots) and compares the outcome
with the baseline relation (blue dots).25 Interestingly, the (r?,pi?) locus has essentially the same slope in
the low r? region. Here again, we find a slope close to -1. However, the curve is somewhat steeper in the
high r? region and shifted up, compared to the baseline scenario. This reflects that under larger demand
shocks, even at very high levels of the natural rate, a drop in the latter is conducive to more frequent ZLB
episodes. The social planner is then willing to increase the inflation target at a higher pace than in the
baseline scenario and generically sets the inflation target at higher levels to hedge the economy against
22Robustness to altering the monetary policy rule is assessed further below.
23See Appendix Section I in which such counterfactual probabilities of ZLB are reported.
24In addition to per period probability of ZLB, these authors also put forward and emphasize the probability that a ZLB event
occurs in the next decade. By construction this number is a larger one, and the mapping between the two numbers is not fully
straightforward
25We obtain this figure using the same procedure as outlined before. Here again, we run several passes with successively refined
inflation grids.
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Figure 6: (r?,pi?) relation with larger demand shocks
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Note: the blues dots correspond to the baseline scenario wherein all the structural parameters are set at their posterior mean θ¯.
The red dots correspond to the counterfactual simulation with σq and σg set to twice their baseline value.
ZLB episodes.
Alternative Mark-ups. The optimal level of inflation in our set-up depends on the elasticities of substitu-
tion among intermediate goods, θp and among labor types θw, since those parameters determine the extent
to which the price and wage dispersion induced by inflation is translated into an inefficient allocation of
resources. These parameters have been calibrated, as they cannot be identified from time-series data and a
log-linearized version of the model.
In our calibration, the baseline value for the elasticity of substitution θp is 6, leading to a steady-state
price mark-up of 20%. While this value is in line with common “textbook” parameterizations (see Galí,
2015), and is close to the baseline value obtained in Hall (2018) and in Christiano et al. (2005), there is con-
siderable uncertainty in the empirical literature about the level of mark-ups. For example, some estimates
in Basu and Fernald (1997) and Traina (2015) point to possibly much smaller values, while Autor et al.
(2017), De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) and Farhi and Gourio (2018) suggest substantially larger figures.
To investigate the robustness of our results, we re-do our main simulation exercise, this time setting θp
to a value as large as 10 or as low as 3. These values largely encompass the range of available empirical
estimates.
Similarly, for the wage mark-up, there is arguably scarcer evidence, and in any case considerable un-
certainty around our baseline parameterization, given by θw set to 3. Here again, so as to cover a broad
24
Figure 7: (r?,pi?) relation with alternative θp
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Note: the blues dots correspond to the baseline scenario wherein all the structural parameters are set at their posterior mean
θ¯. The red dots correspond to the counterfactual simulation with θp set to 10. The green dots correspond to the counterfactual
simulation with θp set to 3.
range of plausible estimates, we run alternatives exercises, setting in turn θw to 8 and θw to 1.5. Results are
reported in Figure 7 in the case of robustness with respect to the price markup, and in Figure 8 with respect
to the wage markup.
The main takeaway from these figures is that our key result is by and large preserved. That is, in the
empirically relevant region (for levels of r? lower than, say, 4 percent), the slope of the (r?,pi?) curve is only
very mildly affected when changing the elasticity of substitution of goods or labor types.
Another noticeable result of this robustness exercise is that, by contrast, in the region with high steady-
state real interest rates (say r? larger than 5 percent) the value of optimal inflation target, and the slope of the
curve of interest, are more sensitive to the value of θp or θw. To see why, first notice that, in this region, the
ZLB is essentially irrelevant so the standard welfare cost of inflation set-up applies. With less substitution
across goods, a given level of price dispersion induced by inflation leads to smaller output dispersion (as is
clear for instance in the polar case of complementary goods, that leads to no output dispersion across firms
at all). The effect of θp on output dispersion is apparent from the formulas in our appendix, or in textbook
derivations of output dispersion e.g. chapter 3 in Galí (2015). Thus, with a low substitution (i.e. a low
θp), the welfare loss due to inflation (or deflation) is smaller. Therefore a lower θp allows for an inflation
target farther away from zero, insofar as there are motives for a non-zero steady-state inflation. Such a
mechanism explains why in Figure 7 optimal inflation is more negative with lower substitution.
Interestingly, when we consider robustness with respect to parameter θw, the ranking of the correspond-
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Figure 8: (r?,pi?) relation with alternative θw
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Note: the blues dots correspond to the baseline scenario wherein all the structural parameters are set at their posterior mean θ¯. The
red dots correspond to the counterfactual simulation with θw set to 8. The green dots correspond to the counterfactual simulation
with θw set to 1.5.
ing curves is reversed (see Figure 8). That is, a larger θw induces a larger inflation target in absolute value.
The reason is that, with a larger substitution across labor types, a given nominal wage growth generates
dispersion of quantities across types of labor that turns out to be particularly costly. In that case, it is op-
timal that the burden of adjustment of real wages to growth is borne not by nominal wages, but rather by
nominal prices (thus leading to a more pronounced deflation).26
Alternative degrees of indexation. The degree of indexation of price and wage is an important determi-
nant of the cost of inflation. In our empirical estimate the degrees of indexation are moderate : 0.22 for
prices and 0.44 for wages at the posterior mean. It is worthwhile examining the sensitivity of our results to
the degree of indexation. Indeed, some existing macro estimates find or impose a much larger degree of in-
dexation (Christiano et al. 2005). By contrast, existing micro studies hardly find any evidence of indexation.
In this robustness exercise, we consider in turn a “zero indexation” case, a high indexation case (setting
γp and γw to 0.7), and a very high indexation case (setting γp and γw to 0.9). The last two configurations
are arguably unrealistic. Results are presented in Figure 9. In the absence of indexation, results are similar
to those under our estimated indexation levels. For the high indexation case (γp and γw equal to 0.7), the
results differ from the baseline only for relatively large values of the steady-state real interest rate.
26 This can be illustrated again in the approximated welfare function, and ignoring the effects of shocks. Then the optimal
inflation obeys pi? ≈ −(λw(1− γz)(1− γw)/[λp(1− γp)2 + λw(1− γw)2])µz. Inflation target is a decreasing function of λw, thus
of θw.
26
Figure 9: (r?,pi?) relation with alternative indexation degrees
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Note: the blues dots correspond to the baseline scenario wherein all the structural parameters are set at their posterior mean θ¯.
The red dots correspond to the counterfactual simulation with γp = γw = 0 . The green dots correspond to the counterfactual
simulation with γp = γw = 0.7
In the very high indexation case, the position and shape of the curve are substantially affected: the
curve is indeed nearly a decreasing straight line. Indeed, for a very large indexation degree the welfare
cost of inflation (or deflation) is substantially reduced. As a result, it is optimal to allow for a sizeable trend
deflation when the natural rate is large as a result of a large productivity growth. However, we can note
that in the empirically relevant region, i.e. for r? below 2 percent, the local slope of the curve is similar
whatever the degree of indexation.
5 The Effect of Parameter Uncertainty
In this section we investigate the impact of parameter uncertainty on the relation between the optimal
inflation target and the steady-state real interest rate. Specifically, we analyse how a Bayesian-theoretic
optimal inflation target reacts to a downward shift in the distribution of the steady-state real interest rate.
A Bayesian-theoretic Optimal Inflation Target. The location of the loss function W (pi; θ) evidently de-
pends on the vector of parameters θ describing the economy. As a result of estimation uncertainty around
of θ, the optimal inflation rate pi?(θ) will be subject to uncertainty. Further, a policy maker may wish to
take into account the uncertainty surrounding θ when determining the optimal inflation target. A relevant
feature of the welfare functions in our set-up is that, in general, and as shown above, they are markedly
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asymmetric: adopting an inflation target 1 percentage point below the optimal value generates welfare
losses larger than setting it 1 percentage point above. As a result, the certainty-equivalence does not hold.
A policy maker maximizing expected welfare while recognizing the uncertainty, will choose an inflation
target differing from that corresponding to the case where θ is set to its expected value, and taken to be
known with certainty, as in our baseline analysis.
Formally, the estimated posterior distribution of parameters p(θ|XT) can be exploited to quantify the
impact of parameter uncertainty on the optimal inflation target and to compute a “Bayesian-theoretic opti-
mal inflation target”. We define the latter as the inflation target pi?? which maximizes the expected welfare
not only over the realizations of shocks but also over the realizations of parameters27
pi?? ≡ arg max
pi
∫
θ
W (pi; θ)p(θ|XT)dθ.
We interpret the spread between the optimal Bayesian inflation target and the “certainty-equivalent” op-
timal inflation target at the posterior mean θ¯ as a measure of how uncertainty about the parameter value
affects optimal inflation. Given the nature of the asymmetry in the welfare function, the spread will turn
out to be positive: a Bayesian policy maker will tend to choose a higher inflation target than a policy-
maker taking θ to be known and equal to the mean of its distribution. A higher inflation target indeed acts
as a buffer to hedge against particularly detrimental parameter values (either because they lead to more
frequent ZLB episodes or because they lead to particularly acute inflation distortions). We define
Spr(θ) ≡ pi?? − pi?(θ)
and assess below Spr(θ¯).
Results. According to the simulation exercise, pi?? = 2.40%. This robust optimal inflation target is higher
than the value obtained with θ set at its central tendency. As expected, a Bayesian policy maker chooses
a higher inflation target to hedge against particularly harmful states of the world (i.e., parameter draws)
where the frequency of hitting the ZLB is high.28
Assessing how a change in r? affects pi?? for every value of r? is not possible, due to the computational
cost involved. Such a reaction is thus investigated for a particular scenario: it is assumed that the economy
27This Bayesian inflation target is recovered from simulating the model under a ZLB constraint using the exact same sequence
of shocks {et}Tt=1 with T = 100000 as in the previous subsection (together with the same burn-in sample) and combining it with
N draws of parameters {θj}Nj=1 from the estimated posterior distribution p(θ|XT), with N = 500. As in the previous section,
the social welfare function W (pi; θ) is evaluated for each draw of θ over a grid inflation targets {pi(k)}Kk=1. The Bayesian welfare
criterion is then computed as the average welfare across parameter draws. Here, we start with the same inflation grid as before
and then run several passes. In the first pass, we identify the inflation target maximizing the Bayesian welfare criterion. We then
set a finer grid of K = 51 inflation targets around this value. We repeat this process several times with successively finer grids
of inflation targets until the identified optimal inflation target proves insensitive to the grid. In this particular exercise, some
parameter draws for θ lead to convergence failure in the algorithm implementing the ZLB. These draws are discarded.
28Figure E.1 in Appendix illustrates this point, by showing that the posterior distribution of pi?(θ) is broadly symmetric.
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Figure 10: Posterior distributions of r? and counterfactual r?
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Note:: Plain curve: PDF of r?; dashed vertical line: mean value of r?.
starts from the posterior distribution of parameters p(θ|XT) and that, everything else being constant, the
mean of r? decreases by 100 basis points. Such a 1 percentage point decline is chosen mainly for illustrative
purposes. Yet, it is of a comparable order of magnitude, although somewhat smaller in absolute value,
than recent estimates of the drop of the natural rate after the crisis such as Laubach and Williams (2016)
and Holston et al. (2017). The counterfactual exercise considered can therefore be seen as a relatively con-
servative characterization of the shift in steady-state real interest rate. Figure 10 depicts the counterfactual
shift in the distribution of r? that is considered.
The Bayesian-theoretic optimal inflation target corresponding to the counterfactual lower distribution
of r? is obtained from a simulation exercise that relies on the same procedure as before.29 Given a draw in
the posterior of parameter vector θ, the value of the steady-state real interest rate is computed using the
expression implied by the postulated structural model r?(θ) = ρ(θ) + µz(θ). From this particular draw,
a counterfactual lower steady-state real interest rate, r?(θ∆), is obtained by shifting the long-run growth
component of the model µz downwards by 1 percentage point (in annualized terms). The welfare function
W (pi; θ∆) is then evaluated. Since there are no other changes than this shift in the mean value of µz in the
distribution of the structural parameters, we can characterize the counterfactual distribution p(θ∆|XT) as
a simple transformation of the estimated posterior p(θ|XT). The counterfactual Bayesian-theoretic optimal
29Again, we use the same sequence of shocks and the same parameter draws as in section 3.2.
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Figure 11: Eθ(W (pi, θ)) in baseline and counterfactual
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inflation target is then obtained as
pi??∆ ≡ arg maxpi
∫
θ∆
W (pi; θ∆)p(θ∆|XT)dθ∆.
Figure 11 illustrates the counterfactual change in optimal inflation target obtained when the mean of the
distibution of the steady-state real interest rate declines by 100 basis points. The simulation exercise returns
a value of pi??∆ = 3.30% i.e. 90 basis points higher than the optimal value under uncertainty obtained with
the posterior distribution of parameters in the pre-crisis sample pi??∆ = 2.40%.
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Thus, in our set-up, a monetary authority that is concerned about the uncertainty surrounding the pa-
rameters driving the costs and benefits of the inflation chooses a higher optimal inflation target. However,
the reaction of this optimal inflation target following a drop in the mean r? is hardly altered: a 100 basis
points decrease in the steady-state real interest rate calls for a roughly 90 basis point increase in the optimal
inflation target, in the vicinity of pre-crisis parameter estimates.
A Known Reaction Function. Here we study the consequences of the (plausible) assumption that the
central bank actually knows the coefficients of its interest rate rule with certainty. More specifically we
repeat the same simulation exercise as in the previous subsection but with parameters api, ay and ρi in the
reaction function (3) taken to be known with certainty. In practice we fix these three parameters at their
posterior mean, instead of sampling them from their posterior distribution. This is arguably the relevant
30Figure J.1 in Appendix shows how the posterior distribution of pi? is shifted after the permanent decline in the mean of r?.
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Figure 12: Eθ(W (pi, θ))
Annualized inflation rate
2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
W
el
fa
re
 (n
orm
ali
ze
d)
-4
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
4:?? = 2:24
4:?? = 3:16
Average welfare over posterior distribution of 3
Average welfare over perturbed posterior distribution of 3
Note:: Blue curve: Eθ(W (pi, θ)); Red curve: Eθ(W (pi, θ)) with lower r?. In each case, ρi, api , and ay are frozen at their posterior
mean values.
approach from the point of view of the policymaker.31 Note, however, that all the other parameters are
subject to uncertainty from the stand-point of the central bank.
Figure 12 presents the Bayesian-theoretic optimal inflation targets obtained when simulating the model
at the initial posteriors and after a -100 basis points level shift in the posterior distribution of the long-run
growth rate µz and, hence, the steady-state real rate r?. According to these simulations, the inflation target
should initially be pi?? = 2.24%. After the counterfactual change in the distribution of r? considered, pi??
should be increased to 3.16%, again in the ballpark of a 90 basis points increase in pi? in response to a 100
basis points downward shift in the distribution of r?.
6 Alternative Monetary Policy Rules and Environments
In the present section we study the optimal adjustment of the inflation target in response to a change in
the steady-state real interest rate under five alternative assumptions regarding monetary policy: setting
the inflation target in terms of average realized inflation ; an effective lower bound on the policy rate that
can be below zero; alternative degrees of smoothing in the policy rule; a central bank with no “lower for
longer” strategy; and a price level targeting rule. For simplicity, throughout this section we ignore the role
31In practice, long-run inflation targets are seldom reconsidered while the rotation in monetary policy committees happens at a
higher frequency. From this viewpoint, our baseline assumption of uncertainty on all the monetary policy rule parameters is not
necessarily unwarranted.
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Figure 13: Average realized inflation and optimal inflation
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of uncertainty, and treat the model parameters as known.
Average vs Target Inflation. As emphasized in recent works (see, notably, Hills et al. 2016, Kiley and
Roberts 2017), when the probability of hitting the ZLB is non-negligible, realized inflation is on average
significantly lower than the inflation rate that the central bank targets in the interest rate rule (and which
would correspond to steady-state inflation in the absence of shocks or in a linear model). This results from
the fact that anytime the ZLB is binding (a recurrent event), the central bank effectively loses its ability to
stabilize inflation around the target. Knowing this, it may be relevant to assess the central banks outcomes
and set the corresponding target in terms of the effective average realized inflation. In this section, we
investigate whether measuring inflation target in this alternative way matter.
To this end, the analysis of the (r?,pi?) relation of section 3.2 is complemented here with the analysis
of the relation between r? and the average realized inflation rate E{pit} obtained when simulating the
model for various values of r? and the associated optimal inflation target pi?. In the interest of brevity, the
calculations are presented only in the case when the source of variation in the natural interest rate is the
change in average productivity growth µz.
Figure 13 illustrates the difference between the (r?,pi?) curve (blue dots) and the (r?,E{pit}) curve (red
dots). The overall shape of the curve is unchanged. Unsurprisingly, both curves are identical when r? is
high enough. In this case, the ZLB is (almost) not binding and average realized inflation does not differ
much from pi?. A spread between the two emerges for very low values of r?. There, for low values of the
natural rate, the ZLB incidence is higher and, as a result, average realized inflation becomes indeed lower
32
Figure 14: Optimal inflation with a negative ELB
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than the optimal inflation target. However, that spread remains limited, less than 10 basis points. The
reason is that the implied optimal inflation target is sufficiently high to prevent the ZLB from binding too
frequently, thus limiting the extent to which average realized inflation and pi? can differ.
Unreported simulation results show that the gap between pi? and average realized inflation becomes
more substantial when the inflation target is below its optimal value. For instance, mean inflation is
roughly zero when the central bank adopts a 1% inflation target in an economy where the optimal inflation
target is pi? = 2%.
A Negative Effective Lower Bound. The recent experience of many advanced economies (including the
euro area) points to an effective lower bound (ELB) for the nominal interest rate below zero. For instance,
the ECB’s deposit facility rate, which gears the overnight money market rate because of excess liquidity,
was set at a negative value of −10 basis points in June 2014 and has been further lowered down to −40
basis points in March 2016.
We use the estimated model to evaluate the implications of a negative ELB in the US. More precisely,
we set the lower bound on the nominal rate it so that
it ≥ e
and we set e to −40 basis points (in annual terms) instead of zero. Results are presented in Figure 14. As
expected, the (r?,pi?) locus is shifted downwards, though by somewhat less than 40 basis points. Impor-
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tantly, its slope remains identical to the baseline case: around the baseline value for the real interest rate, a
100 basis points downward shift in the distribution of r? calls for around a 90 basis points increase in pi?.
Alternative degrees of Interest Rate Smoothing. Our analysis is conditional on a specific reaction func-
tion of the central bank, described in our setup by the set of parameters api, ay and ρi. Among these
parameters, the smoothing parameter, ρi, has a key influence on the probability of being in a ZLB regime.
A higher smoothing has two effects in our model. The first effect is -through standard monetary policy
rule inertia- to reduce the speed at which interest rates are raised when the economy exits the lower bound
regime since the current rate inherits the past values of the effective nominal rate. The second effect comes
from the fact that the smoothing applies to the notional rate int that would prevail absent the lower bound
constraint (see equation 6) while the effective nominal interest rate is the maximum of zero and the no-
tional rate (see equation 5). Thus the interest rate inherits the past negative values of the notional nominal
rate. So, a higher smoothing results in maintaining the effective interest rate at zero for an extended pe-
riod of time beyond that implied by the macroeconomic shocks that initially brought the economy at the
zero lower bound constraint. Such a monetary policy strategy introduces history-dependence whereby,
in the instance of a ZLB episode, the central bank is committed to keep rates lower for longer. As this
reaction function is known to the agents in the model, this commitment to future accommodation, through
generating higher expected inflation and output, helps exiting the trap (or even not entering it).
Through both effects, a higher degree of smoothing thus reinforces the history-dependence of monetary
policy, and tends to shorten the length of ZLB episodes and the probability of hitting the ZLB constraint.
Everything else equal, one should therefore expect a lower optimal inflation rate for higher values of the
smoothing parameters. This property of the model is illustrated in Figure 15 which depicts the (r?,pi?)
relation under three possible values of the smoothing parameter ρi. The value used under our baseline
scenario, i.e. posterior mean estimates, are 0.85. We also consider two alternative settings: A higher value
of ρi = .95 which is close to the inertia of the central bank reaction function in Coibion et al. (2012), and
a lower value of ρi = .8. These two values arguably encompass the existing empirical uncertainty on
the degree of smoothing, as they stand outside the 90 % probability interval of our posterior parameter
estimates.
The effect of a higher interest rate smoothing is to shift downward the (r?,pi?) curve except for high
values of r? for which the probability of hitting the ZLB is close to zero and the optimal inflation target
is slightly negative. Under this strategy, the pre-crisis optimal inflation rate would be close to 0.5% in the
US.32 Conversely, a lower interest rate smoothing shifts the (r?,pi?) curve upward, even for relatively high
values of r? – because the probability of being in a ZLB regime increases under this strategy. With a lower
32This is not inconsistent with the result in Coibion et al. (2012) who report an optimal inflation target of 1.5% under their
baseline calibration on US post WWII data. Indeed, the variance of their underlying shocks is higher than in our baseline which
is based on a Great-Moderation estimates. As discussed above, a higher variance of shocks induces more frequent ZLB episodes,
hence calls for a higher optimal inflation target.
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Figure 15: (r?,pi?) relation with alternative ρi
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Note: The blues dots correspond to the baseline scenario wherein all the structural parameters are set at their posterior mean
θ¯. The red dots correspond to the counterfactual simulation with ρi set to 0.8. The green dots correspond to the counterfactual
simulation with ρi set to 0.95.
ρi, the pre-crisis optimal inflation rate would be close to 3.5%.
As for the slope of the (r?,pi?) curve, in the empirically relevant region, it is much less affected than
the level of this locus. It is however more affected in this exercise than in other robustness experiments
considered above. A very large smoothing parameter, due to its effect outlined above on the probability
of ZLB, somewhat alleviates the extent to which an increase in the inflation target is needed. The slope is
indeed close to −.7 in that case. For a strategy associated with a low smoothing parameter, the slope is
close to −1, so closer to the benchmark case. For large values of r?, the degree of smoothing is irrelevant.
More traditional specifications of the policy rule. We also considered the case of a monetary policy rule
featuring no shadow rate (i.e. no “lower for longer” feature), as well as of a simple non intertial Taylor
rule. Results are reported in Figures 16 and 17. In the first case, the lagged interest rate is the lagged actual
rate. As soon as the lift-off occurs after a ZLB episode, interest rate follow a standard path, so monetary
policy does not “keep memory” that it has been constrained for some periods by the ZLB (unlike under
our baseline specification). In the second case, there is no inertia at all, but we use a 4-quarter inflation
rate as in the standard Taylor rule (and its implementation in Kiley and Roberts (2017)). In both cases,
the overall degree of monetary policy inertia decreases, and so the stabilization property of the policy rule
is weaker in our forward-looking model, materializing in more frequent ZLB episodes. As a result, the
optimal inflation rate is in both cases larger that in the baseline, for realistic values of the real interest rate.
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Figure 16: (r?,pi?) relation with simple standard Taylor rule
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Note: The blues dots correspond to the baseline scenario . The green dots correspond to the counterfactual simulation with simple
standard Taylor rule used. Parameters of the rules on inflation and output gap are same as in the baseline, but there is no inertia
and 4-quarter inflation is used
Also the optimal inflation rate is positive for a wider range of values of r?. However, in both variants the
slope of the (r?,pi?) is similar to that of our baseline curve around the sample value of r?.
A Price Level Targeting Rule. We finally consider that the rule effectively implemented by the central
bank reacts to deviations of the (log) price level pˆt = pˆt−1 + pˆit to a targeted path, instead of the gap pˆit
between the inflation rate and its optimal target. Formally, we assume that the central bank sets the policy
rate according to the following rule:
ıˆpltt = ρi ıˆ
plt
t−1 + (1− ρi)
(
ap pˆt + ay xˆt
)
+ ζR,t (7)
with ıˆt = max{ıˆpltt , −(µz + ρ+ pi)}.
We perform the same exercices as before, focusing on the case in which average productivity growth
µz is the driver of changes in the natural rate. We consider two values for ap: .1 and .5. All the other
parameters of the model are set to their posterior mean.
Figure 18 reports the (r?,pi?) relation obtained under these two alternative scenarios. A striking fea-
tures of that new curve is that the optimal inflation target lies then between 0% and 1% as opposed to 2.21%
in the baseline. Price level targeting makes the commitment to make-up for past inflation undershooting
(or overshooting) even stronger than what can be obtained when increasing the smoothing parameters in
a rule which targets inflation instead. This commitment stabilizes inflation expectations so that it reduces
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Figure 17: (r?,pi?) relation with “‘no shadow rate” rule
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Note: The blues dots correspond to the baseline scenario . The red dots correspond to the counterfactual non inertial policy rule
used.
both the probability of hitting the zero lower bound and the average length of such episodes. As a conse-
quence, there is no incentive to bear the costs of a positive steady-state inflation and the optimal inflation
target is close to zero. This holds no matter whether the central bank react aggressively or not to deviation
of the price level to its targeted path.
Another striking result is that the (r?,pi?) relation is much flatter in the vicinity of the pre-crisis level for
r? than under alternative inflation targeting monetary policy strategies. The slope is close to -0.3 instead of
the [-1, -0.7] range obtained previously. A price-level targeting strategy thus allows to keep the costs of the
ZLB small even if the natural rate of interest dropped by say 1% compared to the pre-crisis regime.
7 Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we have assessed how changes in the steady-state natural interest rate translate into changes
in the optimal inflation target in a model subject to the ZLB. Our main finding is that, starting from pre-
crisis values, a 1 percentage point decline in the natural rate should be accommodated by an increase in
the optimal inflation target of about 0.9 to 1 percentage point. For convenience, Table 2 recaps our results.
Overall, across the different concepts of optimal inflation considered in this paper, the level of optimal
inflation does vary. However it is a very robust finding that the slope of the (r?,pi?) relation is close to -1
in the vicinity of the pre-crisis value of steady-state real interest rates.
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Figure 18: (r?,pi?) relation with price level targeting strategy
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Note: Simulations obtained under the price level targeting policy rule given in equation 7. The blues (red) dashes correspond to
the scenario wherein ap = .1 (.5). All the other structural parameters are set at their posterior mean θ¯.
Table 2: Effect of a decline in r? under alternative notions of optimal inflation
Baseline Lower r? ∆
Mean of pi? 2.00 3.00 1.00
Median of pi? 1.96 2.90 .94
pi? at post. mean 2.21 3.20 .99
pi? at post. median 2.12 3.11 .99
pi?? 2.40 3.30 .90
pi??, frozen MP 2.24 3.16 .92
Average realized inflation at post. mean 2.20 3.19 .99
pi? at post. mean, ELB -40 bp 1.90 2.83 .93
Average realized inflation at post. mean, ELB -40 bp 1.86 2.77 .91
pi? at post. mean, higher ρi 0.44 1.13 .69
pi? at post. mean, price level targeting 0.06 0.32 .26
Note: all figures are in annualized percentage rate.
In our analysis, we have considered adjusting the inflation target as the only option at the policy-
maker’s disposal. This is not to say that this is the only option in their choice set. As a matter of fact,
recent discussions revolving around monetary policy in the new normal have suggested that the various
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non-conventional measures – forward guidance on interest rates and large scale asset purchases – used in
the aftermath of the Great Recession could feature permanently in the policy toolbox. In particular, uncon-
ventional monetary policies could represent useful second-best instruments when the ZLB is reached, as
advocated by Reifschneider (2016) or Sims and Wu (2019) (see also Eberly et al. 2019 and Chung et al. 2019
for recent work documenting the efficiency of such instruments). Beyond these monetary policy measures,
fiscal policies could also play a significant role, as emphasized by Correia et al. (2013). As a result, the ZLB
might be less stringent a constraint in a practical policy context than in our analysis as argued in Debortoli
et al. (2019) among others. However, the efficacy and the costs of these policies should also be part of the
analysis. The complete comparison of these policy trade-offs goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
An alternative would consist in a change of monetary policy strategies, e.g., adopting variants of the
price-level targeting strategy, as recently advocated by e.g. Williams (2016) or Bernanke et al. (2019). Our
exercises emphasizes that, when the central bank follows such a “making-up” strategy for past inflation
deviations from target, the case for increasing the inflation target is much reduced. Nevertheless, and
as with forward guidance policies, these results are obtained under the assumption that private agents
believe and understand the commitment of the central banker to deviate from its inflation target in order to
compensate for previous deviations, a debatable assumption as emphasized in e.g. Andrade et al. (2019a).
We have discussed the potential desirability of higher inflation target, abstracting from the challenges
of implementing an eventual transition to the new objective. In the current lowflation environment, in-
creasing the inflation target in reaction to a drop in the steady-state value of the real interest rate might
raise some credibility issues. However, a move towards make-up strategies would as well raise substantial
credibility issues, as these imply an arguably time-inconsistent commitment to deviate from the inflation
target once it has been reached.
Finally, our analysis has also abstracted from forces identified in the literature as warranting a small,
positive inflation target, irrespective of ZLB issues, as emphasized in e.g. Bernanke et al. (1999) and Kiley
et al. (2007). The first is grounded on measurement issues, following the finding from the 1996 Boskin
report that the consumer price index did probably over estimate inflation in the US by over 1 percentage
point in the early nineties. The second argument is rooted in downward nominal rigidities. In an economy
where there are such downward rigidities (e.g. in nominal wages) a positive inflation rate can help "grease
the wheel" of the labor market by facilitating relative price adjustments. Symmetrically, we also abstracted
from forces calling for lower inflation targets. The most obvious is the so-called Friedman (1969) rule,
according to which average inflation should be equal to minus the steady-state real interest rate, hence be
negative, in order to minimize loss of resources or utility and the distortionary wedge between cash and
credit goods (e.g. consumption and leisure) induced by a non-zero nominal interest rate. Presumably,
all those were taken into account when deciding the current inflation targets. It is not obvious, however,
that such considerations would alter our conclusions regarding how the optimal inflation target changes
in response to a downward shift in r?. A complete assessment is left for future research.
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Appendix
A Various long-run and optimal inflation rates considered
Table A.1: Various notions of long-run and optimal inflation in the model
pi Any inflation target, used to define the “inflation gap” that enters the Taylor rule
E(pit) Average realized inflation, might differ from pi due to ZLB
pi?(θ) Inflation target that minimizes the loss function given a structural parameters θ
pi?(θ¯) pi? assuming parameters at post. mean
pi?(median(θ)) pi? assuming parameters at post. median
p¯i? average of pi?(θ) over the posterior distribution of θ, i.e.,
∫
θ pi
?(θ)p(θ|XT)dθ
Median(pi?) Median of pi?(θ) over the posterior distribution
pi?? Inflation target that minimizes the average loss function over the posterior distribution of θ
B Illustrating model properties: moments, IRF to monetary policy shock
This section illustrate basic properties of the estimated baseline model.
Table B.1: Moments of key variables
Data 1985Q2-2008Q3
Variable Inflation 4-Quarter -Inflation Output gap Output growth Interest rate
Std. dev. 0.22 0.73 — 0.54 2.20
Simulated Model (with ZLB constraint)
Variable Inflation 4-Quarter -Inflation Output gap Output growth Interest rate
Std. dev. 0.43
(0.11)
1.53
(0.41)
0.58
(0.14)
0.99
(0.14)
2.15
(0.14)
Note: In percent. Inflation is quarterly inflation (not annualized). Interest rate is annualized. 4-Quarter
inflation is the year-on-year growth rate of the price index. The model moments are based on 1000
simulations at the posterior mean. At each simulation, shocks are drawn (with replacement) from the
historical shocks. The figures in parentheses are the standard deviation across bootstrap simulations.
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Figure B.1: Response to a monetary policy shock
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Note: Plain line : response to a monetary policy shoxk leading to -25 basis point cut in the nominal interest on impact. Inflation is
the annualized quarterly growth rate of the price index. Interest rate is annualized.
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C Illustrating the “lower for longer” property of the model policy rule
Figure C.1: Interest rate, inflation and output path in a recession with ELB scenario
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Note: Plain line : actual model policy rule. Dashed line: illustrative interest rule featuring actual rate lagged term rather than
lagged “notional rate” term. The latter rule has no feedback on the model.
In this section, we illustrate how the “lower for longer” property of the model policy rule works in
practice. To this end, we assume that the model starts in steady state and is hit by a series of unexpected
risk-premium shocks that drive the economy to the ZLB. Given the implied path for inflation pˆit, the output
gap xˆt, and the notional rate ıˆnt , we reconstruct the path of an alternative interest rate ı˜t that would obey
ı˜nt = ρi ı˜t−1 + (1− ρi)(apipˆit + ay xˆt) + ζR,t
ı˜t = max{ı˜nt ,−(µz + ρ+ pi)}.
In this alternative specification, the notional rate does not depend on its lagged value but rather on the
lagged value of the nominal interest rate. Away from the ZLB, this has no discernible effect. However,
when the economy hits the ZLB, ı˜nt will mechanically increase sooner than ıˆ
n
t . Figure C.1 reports the out-
come of this simulation. The solid blue line shows the paht of ıˆt while the dashed line shows the implied
path for ı˜t.
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D The distribution of ZLB spells duration
Figure D.1: Distribution of ZLB spells duration at the posterior mean
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Note: Histograms are based on a simulated sample of 500,000 quarters. Simulations are carried out assuming in turn that the
inflation target is the estimated inflation target ; and then that the inflation target is the optimal inflation target obtained using the
mean of the posterior density of estimated parameters
E The distribution of optimal inflation targets
Figure E.1: Posterior Distribution of pi?
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Note: Plain curve: PDF of pi?; Dashed vertical line : Average value of pi? over posterior distribution; Dotted vertical line : Optimal
inflation at the posterior mean of θ; Dashed-dotted vertical line : Bayesian-theoretic optimal inflation
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F The welfare cost of inflation
Following a standard approach when assessing alternative policies, we complement our characterization
of optimal inflation by providing measures of consumption-equivalent welfare gains/losses of choosing a
suboptimal inflation target.
Let W (pi) denote welfare under the inflation target pi. It is defined as
W (pi) = E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
eζg,t log(Cˆt(pi)− ηCˆt−1(pi)e−ζz,t)− χ1+ ν
∫ 1
0
Nt(pi, h)1+νdh
]
+Ψ0(µz, ζz).
Importantly, the welfare function is stated in terms of detrended consumption. The term Ψ0 captures the
part of welfare that depends exclusively on µz and ζz,t and is not affected by changes in the inflation target.
Let us now consider a deterministic economy in which labor supply is held constant at the undistorted
steady-state level Nn and in which agents consume the constant level of detrended consumption Cˆ(pi). We
seek to find the Cˆ(pi) such that this deterministic economy enjoys the same level of welfare as above. Thus
W (pi) = E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
log
(
(1− η)Cˆ(pi))− χ
1+ ν
N1+νn
]
+Ψ0(µz, 0).
Direct manipulations thus yield
W (pi) =
1
1− β
[
log
(
(1− η)Cˆ(pi))− χ
1+ ν
N1+νn
]
+Ψ0(µz, 0)
Consider now an economy with pi = pi? and another one with pi = p˜i 6= pi?. Imagine that in the latter,
consumer are compensated in consumption units in such a way that they are as well off with p˜i as with pi?.
Let 1+ ϕ(pi) denote this percentage increase in consumption. Thus ϕ(pi) is such that
W (pi?) = E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
log
(
(1+ ϕ)(1− η)Cˆ(pi))− χ
1+ ν
N1+νn
]
+Ψ0(µz, 0)
=
log(1+ ϕ(pi))
1− β +W (pi)
It then follows that
ϕ(pi) = exp{(1− β)[W (pi?)−W (pi)]} − 1.
In practice, welfare is approximated to second order.
We compute ϕ(pi) under two alternative steady-state interest rate scenarios. In the first scenario, we set
r? to the baseline estimated value, corresponding to the posterior mean of µz + ρ. In the second scenario,
we consider a downward shift in µz by one percentage point (in annual terms), resulting in a lower steady-
state real rate. The results are reported in Figure F.1. The blue lines show ϕ(pi) in the first scenario and the
red lines show ϕ(pi) under a lower real interest rate. For ease of interpretation, the dashed, vertical lines
indicate the optimal values of inflation under the two alternative interest rate scenarios.
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Figure F.1: Welfare cost of inflation at the posterior mean
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Note: The figure reports the welfare cost of inflation stated as a percentage of steady-state consumption in the optimal setting.
Figures F.1 suggests that in the baseline scenario, the welfare cost of raising or lowering the inflation
target by one percentage point is relatively mild. However, this conclusion is not robust to a lower real
interest rate. As the red line shows, with a one percentage rate lower r?, the welfare cost of inflation is
asymmetric. It would be much costlier to lower the inflation target than to raise it in the neighborhood of
the optimal target. In particular, keeping the inflation target unchanged when faced with a one-percentage
point decline in r? give rise to a 1.5% consumption loss.
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G Further illustrations of the (r?,pi?) relation
G.1 When µz varies
Figure G.1: (r?,pi?) locus when µz varies
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Note: Blue: parameters set at the posterior mean; light blue: parameters set at the posterior median; Lighter blue: parameters set
at the posterior mode. Memo: r? = ρ+ µz. Range for µz: 0.4% to 10% (annualized) .
G.2 When ρ varies
Figure G.2: (r?,pi?) locus when ρ varies
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Note: Blue: parameters set at the posterior mean; light blue: parameters set at the posterior median; Lighter blue: parameters set
at the posterior mode. Memo: r? = ρ+ µz. Range for µz: 0.4% to 10% (annualized) .
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H Nominal and Real Interest Rates
Figure H.1: (r?, i?) locus (at the posterior mean)
Annualized steady-state real interest rate
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Note: the blue dots correspond to the (r?, i?) locus when r? varies with µz; the red dots correspond to the (r?, i?) locus when r?
varies with ρ
I The probability of ZLB under large shocks
Figure I.1: Relation between probability of ZLB at optimal inflation and r? (at the posterior mean)
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Note: the blue dots correspond to the (r?,pi?) locus when r? varies with µz in the baseline; the red dots correspond to the locus
in the “large shocks” case; the green dots correspond to the (r?,pi?) locus in the “large shocks” case when pi? is left at its sample
inflation value.
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J Distribution of pi? following a downward shift of the distribution of r?
Figure J.1: Counterfactual - US
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Note: The dashed vertical line indicates the mean value, i.e. Eθ(pi?(θ)).
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K Model Solution
K.1 Households
K.1.1 First Order Conditions
The Lagrangian associated with the program (1) under constraint (2) is
Lt = Et
∞
∑
s=0
βs
{
eζc,t+s log(Ct+s − ηˆCt+s−1)− χ1+ ν
∫ 1
0
eζh,t+s(Nt+s(h))1+νdh
− Λt+s
Pt+s
[
Pt+sCt+s + Qt+sBt+se−ζq,t+s + Pt+staxt+s −
∫ 1
0
Wt+s(h)Nt+s(h)dh− Bt+s−1 − Pt+sdivt+s
]}
,
The associated first-order condition with respect to bonds is
∂Lt
∂Bt
= 0⇔ ΛtQte−ζq,t = βEt
{
Λt+1
Πt+1
}
, (K.1)
and the first-order condition with respect to consumption is
∂Lt
∂Ct
= 0⇔ e
ζc,t
Ct − ηˆCt−1 − βηˆEt
{
eζc,t+1
Ct+1 − ηCt
}
= Λt. (K.2)
where Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 represents the (gross) inflation rate, and
We induce stationarity by normalizing trending variables by the level of technical progress. To this end,
we use the subscript z to refer to a normalized variable. For example, we define
Cz,t ≡ CtZt , Λz,t ≡ ΛtZt,
where it is recalled that
Zt = ezt
with
zt = µz + zt−1 + ζz,t.
We then rewrite the first order condition in terms of the normalized variables. Equation (K.2) thus
rewrites
eζc,t
Cz,t − ηCz,t−1e−ζz,t − βηEt
{
e−ζz,t+1
eζc,t+1
Cz,t+1 − ηCz,te−ζz,t+1
}
= Λz,t, (K.3)
Similarly, equation (K.1) rewrites
Λz,tQte−ζq,t = βe−µzEt
{
e−ζz,t+1
Λz,t+1
Πt+1
}
, (K.4)
where we defined
η ≡ ηˆe−µz .
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Let us define it ≡ − log(Qt) and for any generic variable Xt
xt ≡ log(Xt), xˆt ≡ xt − x
where x is the steady-state value of x. Using these definitions, log-linearizing equation (K.3) yields
gˆt + βηEt{cˆt+1} − (1+ βη2)cˆt + ηcˆt−1 − η(ζz,t − βEt {ζz,t+1}) = ϕ−1λˆt (K.5)
where we defined
ϕ−1 ≡ (1− βη)(1− η),
gˆt = (1− η)(ζc,t − βηEt{ζc,t+1}).
Similarly, log-linearizing equation (K.4) yields
λˆt = ıˆt +Et{λˆt+1 − pˆit+1 − ζz,t+1}+ ζq,t. (K.6)
K.2 Firms
Expressing the demand function in normalized terms yields
Yz,t( f ) =
(
Pt( f )
Pt
)−θp
Yz,t,
In the case of a firm not drawn to re-optimize, this equation specializes to (in log-linear terms)
yˆt,t+s( f )− yˆt+s = θp(pˆit,t+s − δˆpt,t+s − pˆ?t ( f )). (K.7)
K.2.1 Cost Minimization
The real cost of producing Yt( f ) units of good of f is
Wt
Pt
Lt( f ) =
Wt
Pt
(
Yt( f )
Zt
)φ
(K.8)
The associated real marginal cost is thus
St( f ) = φ
Wt
PtZt
(
Yt( f )
Zt
)φ−1
(K.9)
It is useful at this stage to restate the production function in log-linearized terms:
yˆz,t( f ) =
1
φ
nˆt( f ) (K.10)
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K.2.2 Price Setting of Intermediate Goods: Optimization
Firm f chooses P?t ( f ) in order to maximize
Et
∞
∑
s=0
(βαp)
sΛt+s
{
(1+ τp,t+s)
Vpt,t+sP
?
t ( f )
Pt+s
Y?t,t+s( f )− S (Yt,t+s( f ))
}
, (K.11)
subject to the demand function
Y?t,t+s( f ) =
(
Vpt,t+sP
?
t ( f )
Pt+s
)−θp
Yt+s.
and the cost schedule (K.8), where Λt is the representative household’s marginal utility of wealth, and
Et{·} is the expectation operator conditional on information available as of time t. That Λt appears in the
above maximization program reflects the fact that the representative household is the ultimate owner of
firm f .
The associated first-order condition is
Et
∞
∑
s=0
(βαp)
sΛt+s

(
Vpt,TP
?
t ( f )
Pt+s
)1−θp
Yt+s − µp1+ τp e
ζu,t+s
Wt+s
Pt+s
φ
(Vpt,t+sP?t ( f )
Pt+s
)−θp
Yt+s
Zt+s
φ = 0,
where
µp ≡ θp
θp − 1.
This rewrites (
P?t ( f )
Pt
)1+θp(φ−1)
=
µp
1+ τp
Kp,t
Fp,t
where
Kp,t = Et
∞
∑
s=0
(βαp)
sΛz,t+seζu,t+s
Wz,t+s
Pt+s
φ
( Vpt,t+s
Πt,t+s
)−θp
Yz,t+s
φ
and
Fp,t = Et
∞
∑
s=0
(βαp)
sΛz,T
(
Vpt,t+s
Πt,t+s
)1−θp
Yz,t+s,
where Πt,t+s ≡ Pt+s/Pt.
Notice that
Kp,t = φΛz,teζu,t
Wz,t
Pt
(Yz,t)φ + βαpEt
(
(Πt))γp
Πt+1
)−φθp
Kp,t+1,
and
Fp,t = Λz,tYz,t + βαpEt
(
(Πt)γp
Πt+1
)1−θp
Fp,t+1.
With a slight abuse of notation, we obtain the steady-state relation(
P?
P
)1+θp(φ−1)
=
µp
1+ τp
φ
Wz
P
Yφ−1z
1− βαp(Π)(1−γp)(θp−1)
1− βαp(Π)φθp(1−γp)
.
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Log-linearizing yields
[1+ θp(φ− 1)](p?t − pt) = kˆp,t − fˆp,t
kˆp,t = (1−ωK,p)[λˆz,t + ωˆt + φyˆz,t + ζu,t] +ωK,pEt{kˆp,t+1 + φθp(pˆit+1 − γppˆit)},
and
fˆp,t = (1−ωF,p)(λˆz,t + yˆz,t) +ωF,pEt{ fˆp,t+1 + (θp − 1)(pˆit+1 − γppˆit)}.
where we defined the de-trended real wage
ωt ≡ wz,t − pt
and the auxiliary parameters
ωK,p ≡ βαp(Π)(1−γp)φθp
and
ωF,p ≡ βαp(Π)(1−γp)(θp−1).
Finally, notice that
P1−θpt =
∫ 1
0
Pt( f )1−θp d f
= (1− αp)(P?t )1−θp + αp
∫ 1
0
[(Πt−1))γp Pt−1( f )]
1−θp d f .
Thus
1 = (1− αp)
(
P?t
Pt
)1−θp
+ αp
[
(Πt−1)γp
Πt
]1−θp
.
The steady-state relation is (
P?
P
)1−θp
=
1− αp(Π)(1−γp)(θp−1)
1− αp .
Log-linearizing this yields
pˆ?t =
ωF,p
β−ωF,p (pˆit − γppˆit−1).
K.3 Unions
K.3.1 Wage Setting
Union h sets W?t (h) so as to maximize
Et
∞
∑
s=0
(βαw)
s
{
(1+ τw)
Λt+s
Pt+s
eγzµzsVwt,t+sW
?
t (h)Nt,t+s(h)−
χ
1+ ν
eζh,t+s(Nt,t+s(h))1+ν
}
,
where
Nt,t+s(h) =
(
eγzµzsVwt,t+sW
?
t (h)
Wt+s
)−θw
Nt+s.
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The associated first-order condition is
Et
∞
∑
s=0
(βαw)
s
{
ΛT
Wt+s
Pt+s
ht+s
(
eγzµzsVwt,T
Πwt,t+s
W?t (h)
Wt+s
)1−θw
− µw
1+ τw
χeζh,t+s
(
eγzµzsVwt,t+s
Πwt,t+s
W?t (h)
Wt+s
)−(1+ν)θw
N1+νt+s
}
= 0,
where Πwt,t+s = Wt+s/Wt.
Rearranging yields (
W?t (h)
Wt
)1+θwν
=
µw
1+ τw
Kw,t
Fw,t
,
where
Kw,t = Et
∞
∑
s=0
(βαw)
s
χeζh,t+s
(
eγzµzsVwt,t+s
Πwt,t+s
)−(1+ν)θw
N1+νt+s
 ,
Fw,t = Et
∞
∑
s=0
(βαw)
s
Λt+s Wt+sPt+s Nt+s
(
eγzµzsVwt,t+s
Πwt,t+s
)1−θw ,
and where Πwt,t+s ≡Wt+s/Wt.
Notice that
Kw,t = χeζh,t N1+νt + βαwEt
{(
eγzµz
(Πt)γw
Πw,t+1
)−(1+ν)θw
Kw,t+1
}
,
and
Fw,t = Λz,t
Wz,t
Pt
Nt + βαwEt
{(
eγzµz
(Πt)γw
Πw,t+1
)1−θw
Fw,t+1
}
.
The associated steady-state relations are(
W?
W
)1+θwν
=
µw
1+ τw
Kw
Fw
,
Kw =
χN1+ν
1− βαw[e(1−γz)µz(Π)1−γw ](1+ν)θw
,
Fw =
ΛWzP H
1− βαw[e(1−γz)µz(Π)1−γw ]θw−1
.
Log-linearizing the above equations finally yields
(1+ θwν)(w?t − wt) = kˆw,t − fˆw,t,
kˆw,t = (1−ωK,w)[(1+ ν)nˆt + ζh,t] +ωK,wEt{kˆw,t+1 + (1+ ν)θw(pˆiw,t+1 − γwpˆit)},
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fˆw,t = (1−ωF,w)(λˆz,t + ωˆt + nˆt) +ωF,wEt{ fˆw,t+1 + (θw − 1)(pˆiw,t+1 − γwpˆit)},
where we defined
ωK,w = βαw[e(1−γz)µz(Π)(1−γw)](1+ν)θw ,
ωF,w = βαw[e(1−γz)µz(Π)(1−γw)]θw−1.
To complete this section, notice that
1 = (1− αw)
(
W?t
Wt
)1−θw
+ αw
(
eγzµz
[Πt−1]γw
Πw,t
)1−θw
and
w?t − wt =
ωF,w
β−ωF,w (pˆiw,t − γwpˆit−1).
K.4 Market Clearing
The clearing on the labor market implies
Nt =
(
Yt
Zt
)φ ∫ 1
0
(
Pt( f )
Pt
)−φθp
d f .
Let us define
Ξp,t =
( ∫ 1
0
(
Pt( f )
Pt
)−φθp
d f
)−1/(φθp)
,
so that
Nt = (Yz,tΞ
−θp
p,t )
φ.
Hence, expressed in log-linear terms, this equation reads
nˆt = φ(yˆz,t − θp ξˆp,t).
Notice that
Ξ−φθpp,t = (1− αp)
(
P?t
Pt
)−φθp
+ αp
(
[Πt−1]γp
Πt
)−φθp
Ξ−φθpp,t−1.
The associated steady-state relation is
Ξ−φθpp =
(1− αp)
1− αp(Π)(1−γp)φθp
(
P?
P
)−φθp
.
Log-linearizing the price dispersion yields
ξˆp,t = (1−ωΞ)(p?t − pt) +ωΞ[ξˆp,t−1 − (pˆit − γppˆit−1)]
where we defined
ωΞ = αp(Π)(1−γp)φθp .
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K.5 Natural Rate of Output
The natural rate of output is the level of production that would prevail in an economy without nominal
rigidities, i.e. αp = αw = 0 and without cost-push shocks (i.e., ζu,t = 0). Under such circumstances, the
dynamic system simplifies to
wˆnz,t + (φ− 1)yˆnz,t = 0,
νnˆnt + ζh,t = λˆ
n
z,t + wˆ
n
z,t,
nˆnt = φyˆ
n
z,t,
gˆt + βηEt{yˆnz,t+1} − (1+ βη2)yˆnz,t + ηyˆnz,t−1 − η(ζz,t − βEt{ζz,t+1}) = ϕ−1λˆnz,t,
where the superscript n stands for natural.
Combining these equations yields
[ϕ(1+ βη2) +ω]yˆnz,t − ϕβηEt{yˆnz,t+1} − ϕηyˆnz,t−1 = ϕgˆt − ζh,t − ϕηζ∗z,t
where we defined
ω ≡ νφ+ φ− 1,
and
ζ∗z,t = ζz,t − βEt{ζz,t+1}
K.6 Working Out the Steady State
The steady state is defined by the following set of equations
1− βη
(1− η)C = Λz,
e−i = βe−µzΠ−1,
(
P?
P
)1+θp(φ−1)
=
µp
1+ τp
Kp
Fp
,
Kp =
φΛz WzP Y
φ
z
1− βαp(Π)φθp(1−γp)
,
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Fp =
ΛzYz
1− βαp(Π)(1−γp)(θp−1)
,
(
P?
P
)1−θp
=
1− αp(Π)(1−γp)(θp−1)
1− αp ,
(
W?
W
)1+θwν
=
µw
1+ τw
Kw
Fw
,
Kw =
χN1+ν
1− βαw[e(1−γz)µz(Π)1−γw ](1+ν)θw
,
Fw =
Λz WzP H
1− βαw[e(1−γz)µz(Π)1−γw ]θw−1
,
(
W?
W
)1−θw
=
1− αw[e(1−γz)µz(Π)(1−γw)]θw−1
1− αw ,
Πw = Πeµz
We can solve for i and Πw using
Πw = Πeµz
1 = βe−µz eiΠ−1,
Standard manipulations yield
1−ωK,p
1−ωF,p
(
β(1− αp)
β−ωF,p
) 1+θp(φ−1)
θp−1
=
µp
1+ τp
φ
Wz
P
Yφ−1z ,
where we used
ωK,p = βαp(Π)(1−γp)φθp
ωF,p = βαp(Π)(1−γp)(θp−1)
Similar manipulations yield
1−ωK,w
1−ωF,w
(
β(1− αw)
β−ωF,w
) 1+θwν
θw−1
=
µw
1+ τw
χNν
Λz WzP
,
where we used
ωK,w = βαw[e(1−γz)µz(Π)(1−γw)](1+ν)θw
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ωF,w = βαw[e(1−γz)µz(Π)(1−γw)]θw−1
Combining these conditions yields
1−ωK,w
1−ωF,w
(
β(1− αw)
β−ωF,w
) 1+θwν
θw−1 1−ωK,p
1−ωF,p
(
β(1− αp)
β−ωF,p
) 1+θp(φ−1)
θp−1
=
µw
1+ τw
µp
1+ τp
1− η
1− βηφχN
νYφz
Now, recall that
(YzΞ
−θp
p )
φ = N
Then, using
Ξ−φθpp =
1− αp
1−ωΞ
(
P?
P
)−φθp
,
and (
P?
P
)−φθp
=
(
β(1− αp)
β−ωF,p
)−φ θpθp−1
we end up with
NνYφz =
 1− αp
1−ωΞ
(
β(1− αp)
β−ωF,p
)−φ θpθp−1ν Y(1+ν)φz ,
so that
Ω =
µw
1+ τw
µp
1+ τp
1− η
1− βηφχY
(1+ν)φ
z ,
where
Ω =
1−ωK,w
1−ωF,w
(
β(1− αw)
β−ωF,w
) 1+θwν
θw−1 1−ωK,p
1−ωF,p
(
β(1− αp)
β−ωF,p
) 1+θp [(1+ν)φ−1]
θp−1
(
1−ωΞ
1− αp
)ν
Recall that we defined the natural rate of output as the level of production that would prevail in an
economy without nominal rigidities, i.e. αp = αw = 0, and no cost-push shock. Under such circumstances,
the steady-state value of the (normalized) natural rate of output Ynz obeys
1 =
µw
1+ τw
µp
1+ τp
1− η
1− βηφχ(Y
n
z )
φ(1+ν).
It follows that the steady-state distortion due to sticky prices and wages (and less than perfect indexa-
tion) is (
Yz
Ynz
)φ(1+ν)
= Ω.
L Welfare
Let us define for any generic variable Xt
Xt − X
X
= xˆt +
1
2
xˆ2t +O(||ζ||3)
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Xt − Xn
Xn
= x˜t +
1
2
x˜2t +O(||ζ||3)
Below, we repeatedly use the following two lemmas:
Lemma 1. Let g(·) be a twice differentiable function and let X be a stationary random variable. Then
E{g(X)} = g(E{X}) + 1
2
g′′(E{X})V{X}+O(||X||3).
Lemma 2. Let g(·) be a twice differentiable function and let x be a stationary random variable. Then
V{g(X)} = [g′(E{X})]2V{X}+O(||X||3).
In the rest of this section, we take a second-order approximation of welfare, where we consider the
inflation rate as an expansion parameter. It follows that we consider the welfare effects of non-zero trend
inflation only up to second order.
L.1 Second-Order Approximation of Utility
Consider first the utility derived from consumption. For the sake of notational simplicity, define
U(Cz,t − ηCz,t−1e−ζz,t) = log(Cz,t − ηCz,t−1e−ζz,t)
We thus obtain
eζc,tU(Cz,t − ηCz,t−1e−ζz,t) = 11− η
[(
Cz,t − Cnz
Cnz
)
− η
(
Cz,t−1 − Cnz
Cnz
)
− 1
2
1
(1− η)
(
Cz,t − Cnz
Cnz
)2
+
η
(1− η)
(
Cz,t − Cnz
Cnz
)(
Cz,t−1 − Cnz
Cnz
)
− 1
2
η2
(1− η)
(
Cz,t−1 − Cnz
Cnz
)2
+ ζc,t
(
Cz,t − Cnz
Cnz
)
− ηζc,t
(
Cz,t−1 − Cnz
Cnz
)
− η
(1− η) ζz,t
(
Cz,t − Cnz
Cnz
)
+
η
(1− η) ζz,t
(
Cz,t−1 − Cnz
Cnz
)]
+ t.i.p+O(||ζ||3),
where t.i.p stands for terms independent of policy.
Then, using
Cz,t − Cnz
Cnz
= c˜z,t +
1
2
c˜2z,t +O(||ζ||3)
we obtain
eζc,tU(Cz,t − ηCz,t−1e−ζz,t) = 11− η
[
c˜z,t − ηc˜z,t−1 + 12 (c˜
2
z,t − ηc˜2z,t−1)
− 1
2
1
1− η c˜
2
z,t +
η
1− η c˜z,t c˜z,t−1 −
1
2
η2
1
1− η c˜
2
z,t−1
+ ζc,t(c˜z,t − ηc˜z,t−1)− η1− η ζz,t(c˜z,t − c˜z,t−1)
]
+ t.i.p+O(||ζ||3),
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Using
ϕ−1 = (1− βη)(1− η)
we obtain
eζc,tU(Cz,t − ηCz,t−1e−ζz,t) = 11− η
[
y˜z,t − ηy˜z,t−1 + 12 (y˜
2
z,t − ηy˜2z,t−1)
− 1
2
(1− βη)ϕy˜2z,t + η(1− βη)ϕy˜z,ty˜z,t−1 −
1
2
η2(1− βη)ϕy˜2z,t−1
+ ζc,t(y˜z,t − ηy˜z,t−1)− η(1− βη)ϕζz,t(y˜z,t − y˜z,t−1)
]
+ t.i.p+O(||ζ||3),
where we imposed the equilibrium condition on the goods market.
Similarly, taking a second-order approximation of labor disutility in the neighborhood of the natural
steady-state Nn yields
χ
1+ ν
eζh,t(Nt(h))1+ν = χ(Nn)1+ν
(
Nt(h)− Nn
Nn
)
+
1
2
χν(Nn)1+ν
(
Nt(h)− Nn
Nn
)2
+ χ(Nn)1+ν
(
Nt(h)− Nn
Nn
)
ζh,t + t.i.p+O(||ζ||3).
Now, using
Nt(h)− Nn
Nn
= n˜t(h) +
1
2
n˜t(h)2 +O(||ζ||3)
we get
χ
1+ ν
eζh,t(Nt(h))1+ν = χ(Nn)1+ν
[
n˜t(h) +
1
2
(1+ ν)n˜t(h)2 + n˜t(h)ζh,t
]
+ t.i.p+O(||ζ||3).
Integrating over the set of labor types, one gets∫ 1
0
χ
1+ ν
eζh,t(Nt(h))1+νdh = χ(Nn)1+ν
[
Eh{n˜t(h)}+ 12 (1+ ν)Eh{n˜t(h)
2}+Eh{n˜t(h)}ζh,t
]
+ t.i.p+O(||ζ||3).
Now, since
Vh{n˜t(h)} = Eh{n˜t(h)2} −Eh{n˜t(h)}2
the above relation rewrites
∫ 1
0
χ
1+ ν
eζh,t(Nt(h))1+νdh = χ(Nn)1+ν
[
Eh{n˜t(h)}+ 12 (1+ ν)(Vh{n˜t(h)}+Eh{n˜t(h)}
2)
+Eh{n˜t(h)}ζh,t
]
+ t.i.p+O(||ζ||3).
We need to express Eh{n˜t(h)} and Vh{n˜t(h)} in terms of the aggregate variables. To this end, we first
establish a series of results, on which we draw later on.
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L.2 Aggregate Labor and Aggregate Output
Notice that
θw − 1
θw
n˜t = log
(∫ 1
0
(
Nt(h)
Nn
)(θw−1)/θw
dh
)
.
Then, applying lemma 1, one obtains
n˜t = Eh{n˜t(h)}+ 12
θw
θw − 1Eh
{(
Nt(h)
Nn
) θw−1
θw
}−2
Vh
{(
Nt(h)
Nn
) θw−1
θw
}
+O(||ζ||3).
Then, notice that
Vh
{(
Nt(h)
Nn
) θw−1
θw
}
= Vh
{
exp
[
(1− θ−1w ) log
(
Nt(h)
Nn
)]}
so that, by applying lemma 2, one obtains
Vh
{(
Nt(h)
Nn
) θw−1
θw
}
= (1− θ−1w )2 exp
(
(1− θ−1w )Eh{n˜t(h)}
)2
Vh{n˜t(h)}+O(||ζ||3).
Similarly
Eh
{(
Nt(h)
Nn
) θw−1
θw
}
= Eh
{
exp
[
(1− θ−1w )n˜t(h)
]}
so that, by applying lemma 1 once more, one obtains
Eh
{(
Nt(h)
Nn
) θw−1
θw
}
= exp
[
(1− θ−1w )Eh{n˜t(h)}
] (
1+
1
2
(1− θ−1w )2Vh{n˜t(h)}
)
+O(||ξ||3).
Then combining the previous results
n˜t = Eh{n˜t(h)}+ 12
1
1− θ−1w
(1− θ−1w )2Vh{n˜t(h)}(
1+ 12 (1− θ−1w )2Vh{n˜t(h)}
)2 +O(||ζ||3).
It is convenient to define
∆h,t ≡ Vh{n˜t(h)}
so that finally
n˜t = Eh{n˜t(h)}+ Q0,h + 1− θ
−1
w
2
Q1,h(∆h,t − ∆n) +O(||ζ||3).
where we defined
Q0,h =
1−θ−1w
2 ∆n[
1+ 12 (1− θ−1w )2∆n
]2
and
Q1,h =
1− 12 (1− θ−1w )2∆n[
1+ 12 (1− θ−1w )2∆n
]3
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Applying the same logic on output and defining
∆y,t ≡ V f {y˜t( f )}
one gets
y˜z,t = E f {y˜z,t( f )}+ Q0,y +
1− θ−1p
2
Q1,y(∆y,t − ∆y) +O(||ζ||3).
where we defined
Q0,y =
1−θ−1p
2 ∆y[
1+ 12 (1− θ−1p )2∆y
]2
and
Q1,y =
1− 12 (1− θ−1p )2∆y[
1+ 12 (1− θ−1p )2∆y
]3
Then recall that
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Lt( f )d f =
∫ 1
0
Yz,t( f )φd f
which implies
Nt
Nn
=
∫ 1
0
(
Yz,t( f )
Ynz
)φ
d f
where we used Nn = (Ynz )φ.
This relation rewrites
n˜t = log
(∫ 1
0
(
Yz,t( f )
Ynz
)φ
d f
)
This expression is of the form
n˜t = log
(
E f
{(
Yz,t( f )
Ynz
)φ})
.
Using lemmas 1 and 2, we obtain the following three approximations
n˜t = E f {φ(y˜z,t( f )− zt)}+ 12
V f
{(
Yz,t( f )
Ynz
)φ}
(
E f
{(
Yz,t( f )
Ynz
)φ})2 +O(||ζ||3),
V f
{(
Yz,t( f )
Ynz
)φ}
= φ2 [exp [φE{y˜z,t( f )}]]2V f {y˜z,t( f )}+O(||ζ||3),
E f
{(
yz,t( f )
ynz
)φ}
= exp [φE{y˜z,t( f )}]
(
1+
1
2
φ2V f {y˜z,t( f )}
)
+O(||ζ||3).
Combining these expressions as before yields
n˜t = φE f {y˜z,t( f )}+ 12φ
2 V f {y˜z,t( f )}(
1+ 12φ
2V f {y˜z,t( f )}
)2 +O(||ζ||3).
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We finally obtain
n˜t = φE f {y˜z,t( f )}+ P0,y + 12φ
2P1,y(∆y,t − ∆y) +O(||ζ||3),
where we used
V f {y˜z,t( f )}(
1+ 12φ
2V f {y˜z,t( f )}
)2 = ∆y(
1+ 12φ
2∆y
)2 + 1− 12φ2∆y(
1+ 12φ
2∆y
)3 (∆y,t − ∆y) +O(||ζ||3)
and defined
P0,y =
1
2φ
2∆y(
1+ 12φ
2∆y
)2
and
P1,y =
1− 12φ2∆y(
1+ 12φ
2∆y
)3
L.3 Aggregate Price and Wage Levels
The aggregate price index is
P1−θpt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt( f )1−θp d f
)
and the aggregate wage index is
W1−θwt =
(∫ 1
0
Wt(h)1−θw dh
)
.
From lemma 1 and the definitions of Pt and Wt, we obtain
pt = E f {pt( f )}+ 12
1
1− θp
V f {Pt( f )1−θp}
E f {Pt( f )1−θp}2
+O(||ζ||3),
and
wt = Eh{wt(h)}+ 12
1
1− θw
Vh{Wt(h)1−θw}
Eh{Wt(h)1−θw}2 +O(||ζ||
3).
Then, from lemma 2, we obtain
V f {Pt( f )1−θp} = V f {exp[(1− θp)pt( f )]}
= (1− θp)2 exp[(1− θp) p¯t]2∆p,t +O(||ζ||3),
and
Vh{Wt(h)1−θw} = Vh{exp[(1− θw)wt(h)]}
= (1− θw)2 exp[(1− θw)w¯t]2∆w,t +O(||ζ||3),
where we defined
p¯t = E f {pt( f )}, w¯t = Eh{wt(h)},
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∆p,t = V f {pt( f )}, ∆w,t = Vh{wt(h)}.
Applying lemma 1 once again, we obtain
E f {Pt( f )1−θp} = E f {exp[(1− θp)pt( f )]}
= exp[(1− θp) p¯t]
(
1+
1
2
(1− θp)2∆p,t
)
and
Eh{Wt(h)1−θw} = Eh{exp[(1− θw)wt(h)]}
= exp[(1− θw)w¯t]
(
1+
1
2
(1− θw)2∆w,t
)
Combining these relations, we obtain
pt = p¯t +
1
2
(1− θp)∆p,t[
1+ 12 (1− θp)2∆p,t
]2 +O(||ζ||3),
and
wt = w¯t +
1
2
(1− θw)∆w,t[
1+ 12 (1− θw)2∆w,t
]2 +O(||ζ||3).
Thus
pt = p¯t + Q0,p +
1− θp
2
Q1,p(∆p,t − ∆p) +O(||ζ||3),
and
wt = w¯t + Q0,w +
1− θw
2
Q1,w(∆w,t − ∆w) +O(||ζ||3).
where we defined
Q0,p =
1−θp
2 ∆p[
1+ 12 (1− θp)2∆p
]2 , Q0,w = 1−θw2 ∆w[
1+ 12 (1− θw)2∆w
]2
and
Q1,p =
1− 12 (1− θp)2∆p[
1+ 12 (1− θp)2∆p
]3 , Q1,w = 1− 12 (1− θw)2∆w[
1+ 12 (1− θw)2∆w
]3
Remark that the constant terms in the second-order approximation of the log-price index can be rewrit-
ten as
Q0,p − 1− θp2 Q1,p∆p =
1
2
(1− θp)3∆2p[
1+ 12 (1− θp)2∆p
]3 .
Finally, using the demand functions, one obtains
y˜z,t( f ) = −θp[pt( f )− pt] + y˜z,t,
n˜t(h) = −θw[wt(h)− wt] + n˜t,
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from which we deduce that
∆y,t = θ2p∆p,t
and
∆h,t = θ2w∆w,t.
L.4 Price and Wage Dispersions
We now derive the law of motion of price dispersion. Notice that
∆p,t = V f {pt( f )− p¯t−1}
Immediate manipulations of the definition of the cross-sectional mean of log-prices yield
p¯t − p¯t−1 = αpγppit−1 + (1− αp)[p?t − p¯t−1]. (L.1)
Then, the classic variance formula yields
∆p,t = E f {[pt( f )− p¯t−1]2} − [E f {pt( f )− p¯t−1}]2
Using this, we obtain
∆p,t = αpE f {[pt−1( f )− p¯t−1 + γppit−1]2}+ (1− αp)[p?t − p¯t−1]2 − [ p¯t − p¯t−1]2
Notice that
(1− αp)[p?t − p¯t−1]2 − [ p¯t − p¯t−1]2
= (1− αp)
[
1
1− αp ( p¯t − p¯t−1)−
αp
1− αpγppit)
]2
− [ p¯t − p¯t−1]2
=
αp
1− αp [ p¯t − p¯t−1 − γppit]
2 − αp[γppit]2
Using this in the above equation yields
∆p,t = αpE f {[pt−1( f )− p¯t−1 + γppit]2} − αp[γppit]2 +
αp
1− αp [ p¯t − p¯t−1 − γppit]
2
Now, notice also that
αpE f {[pt−1( f )− p¯t−1]2} = αpE f {[pt−1( f )− p¯t−1 + γppit]2} − αp[γppit]2
It then follows that
∆p,t = αpE f {[pt−1( f )− p¯t−1]2}+
αp
1− αp [ p¯t − p¯t−1 − γppit]
2
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Hence
∆p,t = αp∆p,t−1 +
αp
1− αp [ p¯t − p¯t−1 − γppit]
2
Using
pt = p¯t + Q0,p +
1− θp
2
Q1,p(∆p,t − ∆p) +O(||ζ||3),
we obtain
p¯t − p¯t−1 = pit −
1− θp
2
Q1,p(∆p,t − ∆p,t−1) +O(||ζ||3).
Hence
∆p,t = αp∆p,t−1 +
αp
1− αp
[
pit − 1− θp2 Q1,p(∆p,t − ∆p,t−1)− γppit−1
]2
+O(||ζ||3).
The steady-state value of ∆p is thus
∆p =
(1− γp)2αp
(1− αp)2 pi
2
We obtain finally
∆p,t = αp∆p,t−1 +
αp
1− αp
[
(1− γp)pi + pˆit − γppˆit−1 −
1− θp
2
Q1,p(∆p,t − ∆p,t−1)
]2
+O(||ζ||3).
For sufficiently small pi, price dispersion ∆p,t is second-order.
We now derive the law of motion of wage dispersion. Following similar steps as for price dispersion,
notice that
∆w,t = Vh{wt(h)− w¯t−1}
Immediate manipulations of the definition of the cross-sectional mean of log-wages yield
w¯t − w¯t−1 = αw(γzµz + γwpit−1) + (1− αw)[w?t − w¯t−1]. (L.2)
Then, the classic variance formula yields
∆w,t = Eh{[wt(h)− w¯t−1]2} − [Eh{wt(h)− w¯t−1}]2
Using this, we obtain
∆w,t = αwEh{[wt−1(h)− w¯t−1 + γzµz + γwpit−1]2}+ (1− αw)[w?t − w¯t−1]2 − [w¯t − w¯t−1]2
Notice that
w?t − w¯t−1 =
1
1− αw (w¯t − w¯t−1)−
αw
1− αw [γzµz + γwpit]
65
so that
(1− αw)[w?t − w¯t−1]2 − [w¯t − w¯t−1]2
= (1− αw)
[ 1
1− αw (w¯t − w¯t−1)−
αw
1− αw [γzµz + γwpit]
]2
− [w¯t − w¯t−1]2
=
αw
1− αw
[
w¯t − w¯t−1 − [γzµz + γwpit]
]2
− αw[γzµz + γwpit]2
Using this in the above equation yields
∆w,t = αwEh{[wt−1(h)− w¯t−1 + γzµz + γwpit]2}
− αw[γw log(1+ pit)]2 + αw1− αw
[
w¯t − w¯t−1 − [γzµz + γwpit]
]2
Now, notice also that
αwEh{[wt−1(h)− w¯t−1]2} = αwEh{[wt−1(h)− w¯t−1 + γzµz + γwpit]2} − αw[γzµz + γwpit]2
It then follows that
∆w,t = αwEh{[wt−1(h)− w¯t−1]2}+ αw1− αw
[
w¯t − w¯t−1 − [γzµz + γppit]
]2
Hence
∆w,t = αw∆w,t−1 +
αw
1− αw
[
w¯t − w¯t−1 − [γzµz + γwpit]
]2
which, in turn, implies
∆w,t = αw∆w,t−1 +
αw
1− αpw [w¯t − w¯t−1 − γzµz − γwpit−1]
2 .
Using
wt = w¯t + Q0,w +
1− θw
2
Q1,w(∆w,t − ∆w) +O(||ζ||3),
we obtain
w¯t − w¯t−1 = piw,t − 1− θw2 Q1,w(∆w,t − ∆w,t−1) +O(||ζ||
3).
Hence
∆w,t = αw∆w,t−1 +
αw
1− αw
[
piw,t − 1− θw2 Q1,w(∆w,t − ∆w,t−1)
− γzµz − γwpit−1
]2
+O(||ζ||3).
The steady-state value of ∆w is thus
∆w =
αw
(1− αw)2 [(1− γz)µz + (1− γw)pi]
2
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We obtain finally
∆w,t = αw∆w,t−1 +
αw
1− αw
[
(1− γz)µz + (1− γw)pi + pˆiw,t − γwpˆit−1
− 1− θw
2
Q1,w(∆w,t − ∆w,t−1)
]2
+O(||ζ||3).
For sufficiently small pi and µz, wage dispersion ∆w,t is second-order.
Because the steady-state value of ∆p is of second-order, many of the expressions previously derived
considerably simplify. In particular, we now obtain
pt = p¯t +
1− θp
2
∆p,t +O(||ζ,pi||3),
wt = w¯t +
1− θw
2
∆w,t +O(||ζ,pi||3), ).
Now, because ∆y and ∆n are proportional to ∆p and ∆w, respectively, and because ∆p and ∆w are both
proportional to pi2, we also obtain
n˜t = Eh{n˜t(h)}+ 1− θ
−1
w
2
∆h,t +O(||ζ,pi||3),
n˜t = φ(E f {y˜z,t( f )} − zt) + 12φ
2∆y,t +O(||ζ,pi||3),
y˜t = E f {y˜t( f )}+
1− θ−1p
2
∆y,t +O(||ζ,pi||3), ).
Thus, for sufficiently small inflation rates, we obtain formulas resembling those derived in Woodford
(2003).
Finally, price and wage dispersions rewrite
∆p,t = αp∆p,t−1 +
αp
1− αp
[
(1− γp)pi + pˆit − γppˆit−1
]2
+O(||ζ,pi||3), ).
∆w,t = αw∆w,t−1 +
αw
1− αw
[
(1− γz)µz + (1− γw)pi + pˆiw,t − γwpˆit−1
]2
+O(||ζ,pi||3), ).
L.5 Combining the Results
Combining the previous results, we obtain
∫ 1
0
χ
1+ ν
eζh,t(Nt(h))1+νdh = χ(Nn)1+ν
[
n˜t +
1
2
(1+ ν)n˜2t + n˜tζh,t
+
1
2
(1+ νθw)θw∆w,t
]
+ t.i.p+O(||ζ,pi||3), ).
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In turn, we have
n˜t = φy˜t +
1
2
φ[(φ− 1)θp + 1]θp∆p,t +O(||ζ,pi||3),
so that
∫ 1
0
χ
1+ ν
eζh,t(Nt(h))1+νdh = φχ(Nn)1+ν
[
(y˜t − zt) + 12 (1+ ν)φy˜
2
t + y˜tζh,t
+
1
2
[(φ− 1)θp + 1]θp∆p,t + 12 (1+ νθw)φ
−1θw∆w,t
]
+ t.i.p+O(||ζ,pi||3), ).
Then, using
(1−Φ)1− βη
1− η = φχ(N
n)1+ν,
where we defined
1−Φ ≡ 1+ τw
µw
1+ τp
µp
,
we obtain
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
{∫ 1
0
χ
1+ ν
eζh,t(Nt(h))1+νdh
}
=
(1−Φ)1− βη
1− η E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
y˜t +
1
2
(1+ ν)φy˜2t + y˜tζh,t
+
1
2
[(φ− 1)θp + 1]θp∆p,t + 12 (1+ νθw)φ
−1θw∆w,t
]
+ t.i.p+O(||ζ,pi||3), ).
Assuming the distortions are themselves negligible, this simplifies further to
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
{∫ 1
0
χ
1+ ν
eζh,t(Nt(h))1+νdh
}
=
1− βη
1− η E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
(1−Φ)y˜t + 12 (1+ ν)φy˜
2
t + y˜tζh,t
+
1
2
[(φ− 1)θp + 1]θp∆p,t + 12 (1+ νθw)φ
−1θw∆w,t
]
+ t.i.p+O(||ζ,pi||3), ).
We now deal with the first term in the utility function. To that end, notice that
∞
∑
t=0
βtat−1 = a−1 + β
∞
∑
t=0
βt−1at−1 = a−1 + β
∞
∑
t=0
βtat.
Using this trick, we obtain
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βteζc,t log(Cz,t − ηCz,t−1e−ζz,t) = 1− βη1− η E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
y˜z,t − 12 [ϕ(1+ βη
2)− 1]y˜2z,t + ηϕy˜z,ty˜z,t−1
+ ϕgˆty˜z,t − ηϕζ∗z,ty˜z,t
]
+ t.i.p+O(||ζ||3),
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where we defined
ϕ−1 ≡ (1− βη)(1− η),
gˆt = (1− η)(ζc,t − βηEt{ζc,t+1}),
so that
(1− βη)ϕgˆt ≡ (ζc,t − βηEt{ζc,t+1}).
and
ζ∗z,t = ζz,t − βEt{ζz,t+1}
Combining terms, we obtain
U0 =
1− βη
1− η E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
Φy˜z,t − 12 [ϕ(1+ βη
2) +ω]y˜2z,t + ηϕy˜z,ty˜z,t−1
+ (ϕgˆt − ζh,t − ϕηζ∗z,t)y˜z,t
− 1
2
[(φ− 1)θp + 1]θp∆p,t − 12 (1+ νθw)φ
−1θw∆w,t
]
+ t.i.p+O(||ζ||3),
where, as defined earlier
ω = (1+ ν)φ− 1
Now, recall that
[ϕ(1+ βη2) +ω]yˆnz,t − ϕβηEt
{
yˆnz,t+1
}− ϕηyˆnz,t−1 = ϕgˆt − ζh,t − ϕηζ∗z,t
Using this above yields
U0 =
1− βη
1− η E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
Φy˜z,t − 12 [ϕ(1+ βη
2) +ω]y˜2z,t + ηϕy˜z,ty˜z,t−1
+ [ϕ(1+ βη2) +ω]yˆnz,ty˜z,t − ϕβηyˆnz,t+1y˜z,t − ϕηyˆnz,t−1y˜z,t
− 1
2
[(φ− 1)θp + 1]θp∆p,t − 12 (1+ νθw)φ
−1θw∆w,t
]
+ t.i.p+O(||ζ||3),
U0 =
1− βη
1− η E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
Φy˜t − 12 [ϕ(1+ βη
2) +ω]y˜2t + ηϕy˜ty˜t−1
+ [ω+ ϕ(1+ βη2)]yˆnt y˜t − ϕβηyˆnt+1y˜t − ϕηyˆnt−1y˜t
− 1
2
[(φ− 1)θp + 1]θp∆p,t − 12 (1+ νθw)φ
−1θw∆w,t
]
+ t.i.p+O(||ξ,pi||3)
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To simplify this expression, we seek constant terms δ0, δ and x? such that
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
{
− 1
2
δ0[(y˜t − yˆnt )− δ(y˜t−1 − yˆnt−1)− x?]2
}
= E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
Φy˜t − 12 [ϕ(1+ βη
2) +ω]y˜2t + ηϕy˜ty˜t−1
+ [ω+ ϕ(1+ βη2)]y˜tyˆnt − ϕβηy˜tyˆnt+1 − ϕηy˜tyˆnt−1
]
+ t.i.p
Developing yields
− δ0
2
[
(y˜t − yˆnt )− δ(y˜t−1 − yˆnt−1)− x∗
]2
= −1
2
δ0y˜2t + δ0y˜tyˆ
n
t + δ0δy˜ty˜t−1 − δ0δy˜tyˆnt−1 − δ0δy˜t−1yˆnt
− 1
2
δ0δ
2y˜2t−1 + δ0δ
2y˜t−1yˆnt−1 + δ0(y˜t − δy˜t−1)xˆ∗ + t.i.p
Thus
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
{
− δ0
2
[(y˜t − yˆnt )− δ(y˜t−1 − yˆnt−1)− x∗]2
}
= E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
{
δ0(1− βδ)xˆ∗y˜t − 12δ0(1+ βδ
2)y˜2t + δ0δy˜ty˜t−1
+ δ0(1+ βδ2)y˜tyˆnt − δ0δy˜tyˆnt−1 − δ0δβy˜tyˆnt+1
}
+ t.i.p
Identifying term by term, we obtain
δ0(1− βδ)x∗ = Φ,
δ0(1+ βδ2) = [ω+ ϕ(1+ βη2)],
δ0δ = ηϕ,
Recall that the steady-state subsidy rates τp and τw are chosen to neutralize markups. Then, it follows that
Φ = x∗ = 0.
Combining these relations, we obtain
ηδ2 − ω+ ϕ)(1+ βη
2)
βϕ
δ+ ηβ−1 = 0,
or equivalently
P(κ) = β−1κ2 − χκ + η2 = 0,
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where
κ = η
δ
,
χ =
ω+ ϕ(1+ βη2)
βϕ
> 0.
Notice that
P(0) = η2 > 0,
P(1) = − ω
βϕ
< 0
so that the two roots of P(κ) = 0 obey
0 < κ1 < 1 < κ2.
In the sequel, we focus on the larger root and define
κ = κ2 =
β
2
(
χ+
√
χ2 − 4η2β−1
)
> 1.
Since δ = η/κ, we have
0 ≤ δ ≤ η < 1.
Thus, given the obtained value for κ, we can deduce δ from which we can compute δ0.
We thus obtain
U0 = −1− βη1− η E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
{
δ0
2
[(y˜t − yˆnt )− δ(y˜t−1 − yˆnt−1)− x∗]2
+
1
2
[(φ− 1)θp + 1]θp∆p,t + 12 (1+ νθw)φ
−1θw∆w,t
}
+ t.i.p+O(||ζ,pi||3), )
The last step consists in expressing price and wage dispersions in terms of squared price and wage
inflations.
Recall that
∆p,t = αp∆p,t−1 +
αp
1− αp
[
(1− γp)pi + pˆit − γppˆit−1
]2
+O(||ζ,pi||3), ).
Iterating backward on this formula yields
∆p,t =
αp
1− αp
t
∑
s=0
αt−sp [(1− γp)pi + pˆis − γppˆis−1]2 + t.i.p+O(||ζ,pi||3), ).
It follows that
∞
∑
t=0
βt∆p,t =
αp
(1− αp)(1− βαp)
∞
∑
t=0
βt[(1− γp)pi + pˆit − γppˆit−1]2 + t.i.p+O(||ζ,pi||3), ).
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and by the same line of reasoning
∞
∑
t=0
βt∆w,t =
αw
(1− αw)(1− βαw)
∞
∑
t=0
βt[(1− γz)µz + (1− γw)pi + pˆiw,t − γwpˆit−1]2 + t.i.p+O(||ζ,pi||3), ).
Thus, defining
λy ≡ δ0
λp ≡ αpθp[(φ− 1)θp + 1]
(1− αp)(1− βαp)
λw ≡ αwφ
−1θw(1+ νθw)
(1− αw)(1− βαw)
Using this and recalling that x∗ = 0, the second order approximations to welfare rewrites
U0 = −12
1− βη
1− η E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
{
λy[xˆt − δxˆt−1 + (1− δ)x¯]2 + λp[(1− γp)pi + pˆit − γppˆit−1]2
+ λw[(1− γz)µz + (1− γw)pi + pˆiw,t − γwpˆit−1]2
}
+ t.i.p+O(||ζ,pi||3),
where we defined
xˆt ≡ yˆt − yˆnt
x¯ ≡ log
(
Yz
Ynz
)
.
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